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THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION TO THE UNITED
STATES: A REASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS AND
THE CHEROKEE INDIANS
JASON C. NELSON*
Perhaps no event in the modern era has been more profoundly
consequential than the European “discovery” of the Americas. . . .
Over a succession of generations, Europeans devised rules intended
to justify the dispossession and subjugation of the native peoples . . . .
Of these rules, the most fundamental were those governing the
1
ownership of land.

INTRODUCTION
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, long before the
end of slavery, many American Indians (Indians) lost vast land
2
holdings on the eastern coast of the United States. For instance,
consider the removal of the so-called “Five Civilized Tribes”—the
Cherokee, Choctaw, Seminole, Chickasaw, and Muscogee—from the
southeastern United States.3 Professor Robert Clinton has analogized
the removal of these indigenous peoples to the Nazi relocation of
4
This analogy is
Jewish populations from all over Europe.
appropriate, not only because the Indians lost their real and personal
property, but also because many of them lost their lives. For
example, an estimated four thousand Cherokees died from hunger,
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1. LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW ix (2005).
2. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 83 (1993).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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exposure, and disease in the well known “Trail of Tears,” when
President Andrew Jackson defied the Supreme Court and forced
5
Cherokees to relocate to Indian Territory. Such egregious acts of
territorial expropriation did not cease in the nineteenth century, but
have continued into the modern era. Tribes such as the Cayuga and
Oneida of New York, and the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot of
Maine have lost significant tribal land holdings in contemporary
6
times. In numerous cases, these property losses occurred via the
unilateral acts of state governments, and often violated treaties that
date back to the colonial period.7 As a result, a plethora of Indian
land claims have surfaced in recent decades, as Indians are granted
8
standing to redress these wrongs.
Yet, not all Indian land losses have achieved the notoriety of the
removal of the Five Civilized Tribes. For instance, long before the
Trail of Tears—in the year 1775—Judge Richard Henderson
negotiated the “Transylvania purchase,” which illegally deprived the
9
Cherokees of a substantial amount of land in what is now Kentucky.
Although the state of Virginia eventually recognized the sale of this
land was void under its preemption law, it did not return the land to
the Cherokees; the state retained the land and retroactively
designated Judge Henderson as the “state’s purchasing agent.”10 This
example is but one of many historical instances in which individual
tribes were wrongfully dispossessed of their lands. Today, many of
these same tribes dwindle on the edge of extinction—lacking federal
or state recognition—as they struggle to maintain a cultural identity.
One such tribe that repeatedly attempted to reclaim its lands and
heritage is the Tsalagiyi Nvdagi (translated as “Cherokee in Texas”),11
12
which settled in Texas territory around 1820.
5. Cherokee Nation, A Brief History of the Trail of Tears, http://www.cherokee.org/
home.aspx?section=culture&culture=culinfo&cat=R2OKZVC/B7c=&ID=aZ38KzfgbsI= (last
visited Jan. 23, 2006). For those interested in exploring the illegal nature of the Cherokees’
forced removal, see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 596 (1832) (the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the removal of the Cherokees to Indian Territory was unconstitutional).
6. Clinton, supra note 2, at 83.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 84.
9. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 14-15.
10. Id. at 15.
11. D. L. Utsidihi Hicks et al., History of the Tsalagiyi Nvdagi, TSALAGIYI NVDAGI:
CHEROKEE IN TEXAS, http://www.texascherokees.org/history.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006);
see also Carol A. Lipscomb, Cherokee Indians, in THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE,
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/CC/bmc51.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
12. See MARY WHATLEY CLARKE, CHIEF BOWLES AND THE TEXAS CHEROKEES 3 (1971).
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The Texas Cherokees (Cherokees or Tribe) spent nearly two
decades living at peace in the region, under both the governments of
Mexico and the Republic of Texas, before being driven from their
homes and land by force in 1839, and losing their leadership in the
13
Over the next century and beyond, the Cherokees
process.
unsuccessfully tried to reorganize as a tribal entity and promulgate
legal claims for their expropriated land.14 Regrettably, their pursuits
were unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, the Cherokees remained
unwavering in their quest to regain tribal sovereignty, and in August
of 1993, a group met to reinstate the Tribe.15 In the words of the
elected Chief D.L. Utsidihi Hicks: “We who have come together to
reinstate our tribe are very proud people. We will last as long as
there is a drop of Ani-Tsalagi [Cherokee] blood left among us.”16
Without question, the Cherokees had a right to reconstitute their
tribe for cultural preservation, but the question remains as to whether
the Cherokees have a viable legal claim to the expropriated territory.
To address this question, the following analysis considers
whether the Cherokees had a valid and binding treaty that was
negotiated with the Republic of Texas in 1836,17 and if so, whether the
U.S. government violated international principles of state succession
when it annexed the Republic of Texas in 1845 and failed to act as a
successor-in-interest to this treaty obligation. In order to properly
evaluate this two-part claim, this Article will proceed through five
Parts. In Part I, the Article summarizes the history of the Cherokees
in Texas, including their migration to the territory, the Tribe’s
permanent settlement, and their execution of a land treaty with the
Republic of Texas, which was allegedly breached (spurring the
Cherokee War). Next, Part II analyzes the validity of the Cherokees’
treaty under both domestic and international law. In Part III, the
analysis discusses the United States’ annexation of the Republic of
Texas in 1845 and evaluates whether the United States had an
obligation to succeed to the treaty under international principles of
13. See infra Part I.
14. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 121-25.
15. Hicks, supra note 11.
16. Tsalagiyi Nvdagi: Cherokee in Texas, http://www.texascherokees.org (last visited Jan.
23, 2006). The reader should note that the Cherokees led by Chief D.L. Utsidihi Hicks are not
the only Cherokee band in Texas. In fact, there are several other groups that claim Cherokee
heritage. Notwithstanding, the Hicks’ band appears to be the largest and best organized group
in the state.
17. DIANNA EVERETT, THE TEXAS CHEROKEES: A PEOPLE BETWEEN TWO FIRES, 18191840, 71 (1990).
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state succession. Next, Part IV considers whether the Cherokees’
inchoate right to the land that they inhabited matured into perfect
title, and if so, whether the Tribe should have been able to pursue a
claim of title to the land under the doctrine of adverse possession.
Finally, Part V explores the continued failure of the United States to
acknowledge the Cherokees’ claim and considers if this stance
offends international sentiments on the treatment of indigenous
peoples. The Conclusion then sums up the Article’s findings,
shortcomings, and implications, and offers potential solutions to the
present-day Cherokees.
I. AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF THE TEXAS CHEROKEES
A comprehensive account of the Cherokee migration to Texas,
and the subsequent events that transpired, is beyond the scope of this
Article. Nevertheless, an abbreviated historical account is required in
order to place the legal issues that are at the crux of this analysis in
the proper context, especially for those who are unfamiliar with Texas
history. This summary does not purport to do justice to the struggles
faced by the Cherokees and other affiliated tribes during this
turbulent historical period. Instead, it serves only to provide the
nescient student of Texas history with helpful background on the
allegedly broken Cherokee treaty.18
19
The Cherokees call themselves the Ani-Yunwiya, which means
20
“principal people.” Indeed, the Cherokees were arguably worthy of
this title as one of the principal tribal nations in the southeastern
United States before their nineteenth century removal21: they
occupied parts of Alabama, Georgia, North and South Carolina,
22
Tennessee, and Virginia. When the first white men ventured into
Cherokee territory in the sixteenth century, the Cherokees had
approximately sixty-four towns and villages, roughly six thousand

18. For a contemporary historical account of the Texas Cherokees, see id. For additional
accounts, see CLARKE, supra note 12; Hicks et al., supra note 11; Lipscomb, supra note 11. For
one of the earliest historical accounts of the Texas Cherokees, see EMMET STARR, HISTORY OF
THE CHEROKEE INDIANS 187-224 (Jack Gregory and Rennard Strickland eds., Indian Heritage
Ass’n 1967) (1921).
19. The word Cherokee is derived from two words: a-che-la, meaning “fire,” and ah-gi,
meaning “he takes.” CLARKE, supra note 12, at 4 (citing Albert Woldert, The Last of the
Cherokees in Texas, and The Life and Death of Chief Bowles, in 1 CHRONICLES OF OKLAHOMA,
NO. 2, at 179-226 (1921-1923)).
20. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 4.
21. Id.
22. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 4.
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warriors,23 and numbered around sixteen thousand people.24 Over the
next two centuries, economic expansionism and colonization in North
America put tremendous pressure on the Cherokees, as well as all
native peoples, in the areas of trade, military alliances, and territorial
25
Notwithstanding, the Cherokees proved to be an
concessions.
adaptive tribe: new and useful material objects, new people, and even
new ideas were adapted to fit Cherokee ways.26
As European empire building continued during the eighteenth
century, wars, epidemics, and food shortages plagued the Cherokees
and resulted in a chronically shrinking population and territory.27
These issues arose as the tribe was fractionalized, which meant the
Cherokees could not produce a united front before their enemies.28
Thus, by 1791, the Cherokees were defeated militarily, and had
negotiated a treaty with the nascent U.S. government in which the
United States stated its intention to “civilize” the Tribe.29 After 1794,
Indian agents also coaxed many Cherokees into farming for their
livelihoods, which further dislocated the Cherokee community, both
socially and culturally.30 From this period through 1810, continuing
pressure for social change, along with concomitant pressure from the
United States for additional land cessions, prompted the development
of more significant factions within the Tribe.31 As a result, many
Cherokees decided to cross the Mississippi River to preserve what
32
remained of their traditional culture and way of life.
33
One departing sect, headed by Chief John Bowles (also known
34
as “Duwali” and “Bold Hunter” ), decided to make its home in the
valley of the St. Francis River, which was in the French territory of

23. Id.
24. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 5.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 5-6.
29. Id. at 6. The agreement negotiated with the Cherokees—the Treaty of Holston
(1791)—was meant to create a perpetual peace and friendship between the United States and
the Cherokee Nation. See Treaty of Holston, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, pmbl., July 2, 1791, 7 Stat.
39, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 29 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904).
30. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 6.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id.
33. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 8.
34. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 10.
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Missouri35 (present-day Missouri and Arkansas36). Bowles was joined
by another headman, Saulowee (also known as “Tsulawi” or “Fox”),
37
and later by another prominent chief, Talontuskee. In 1811, a great
earthquake struck this fertile region, and Chief Bowles moved his
38
people out of the valley and further into Arkansas territory. Bowles’
new settlement was at the mouth of Petit Jean Creek, an area about
four miles from the Arkansas River, near the present-day city of
39
Perryville, Arkansas.
Because this territory was virgin hunting
ground and free of white settlers, other Cherokees soon joined them.40
In fact, by 1813, perhaps one-third of the “Eastern” Cherokees were
41
living west of the Mississippi. Unfortunately, these new “Western”
Cherokees would face the arrival of white settlers in a few short
years.42 Furthermore, when the United States ceded land to the
Cherokee Nation of Arkansas in 1819, Chief Bowles’ village was in an
area that was not included in the land cession and he and his people
were forced to move once again.43
Many Cherokees, Delawares, Creeks, and Choctaws had settled
in a region called “Lost Prairie,”44 which was an area about twenty
45
miles east of present-day Texarkana, Arkansas. Chief Bowles and
his tribe probably joined these Indians briefly after leaving
Arkansas,46 while Bowles’ eventual move into Texas was likely
preceded by “hunting sojourns to the buffalo prairie of the Brazos
47
In short, Bowles liked what he saw in this new
River region.”
country, and he believed that the Cherokees “could live in peace
under the Spanish government in Texas,” as they had done under the

35. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 11-12. Chief Bowles was involved in an altercation with
white settlers where many were killed, though it was not clear he was at fault. Id. at 9-12.
Nonetheless, because the Cherokee were at peace with the U.S. government, he fell into
disfavor with many of the Cherokee Nation. Id. at 11. By fleeing into French territory, Bowles
felt that he and his followers would be safe. Id. at 11-12.
36. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 10.
37. Id. at 10-11.
38. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 13.
39. Id.
40. See EVERETT, supra note 17, at 13.
41. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 13.
42. See EVERETT, supra note 17, at 17.
43. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 13.
44. Id. at 14.
45. Id. (citing Woldert, supra note 19, at 190).
46. Id.
47. STANLEY W. HOIG, THE CHEROKEES AND THEIR CHIEFS 177 (1998).
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French government in Missouri.48 Hence, during the winter of 181949
20, Bowles relocated about one hundred warriors and two hundred
women and children to an area known as “Three Forks of the
Trinity,” which is within the city limits of modern-day Dallas.50
Regrettably, Bowles and his people were forced to abandon the
settlement following a number of conflicts with the Prairie Tribes, in
which the Cherokees suffered heavy casualties.51 Bowles retreated to
the dense forests of East Texas and established a new village near
52
Nacogdoches. Over time, Chief Bowles’s people were joined by
other displaced Cherokee bands, and they linked up with other
refugee Indians to form a “loose confederacy”; these Indians included
the Biloxis, Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, Choctaws, Alabamas,
and Coushattas.53 However, the “Cherokees were the largest and
most important band,” and Chief Bowles was regarded as the chief of
54
them all.
Yet Bowles did not remain chief in Texas for long, as he was
55
soon replaced by Richard Fields, an educated man of mixed blood.
There is no consensus as to why Bowles was replaced by Fields, but it
is possible that the Cherokees believed Fields would be better able to
negotiate rights to Texas land from the Mexican government.56 In
1822, the Cherokees met with the provincial governor in San
Antonio, and entered into a treaty whereby the Cherokees agreed to
subject themselves to Spanish laws as citizens, and “[i]n return they
were granted the right to [peacefully] reside in Texas.”57 Regrettably,
58
the provincial governor did not have the right to make land grants.
Instead, he issued Fields, Bowles, and several other companions a

48.
49.
50.
51.

CLARKE, supra note 12, at 14.
Id.
HOIG, supra note 47.
Id. For further reading on the Prairie Tribes, see AKE HULTKRANTZ, PRAIRIE AND
PLAINS INDIANS (1997), as well as MICHAEL JOHNSON, NATIVE TRIBES OF THE PLAINS AND
PRAIRIE (2004).
52. HOIG, supra note 47, at 177 (citing Woldert, supra note 19, at 190).
53. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 17 (citing James Mooney, Myths of the Cherokee,
NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY, Pt. I, 141
(1900)).
54. Id.
55. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 18 (citing Dorman H. Winfrey, Chief Bowles of the Texas
Cherokee, 32 CHRONICLES OF OKLAHOMA, NO. 1, at 31 (1954)). Notably, Chief Bowles was
also a mixed-blood Indian; he was rumored to be half-Scottish. Id. at 7-8.
56. HOIG, supra note 47, at 178.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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permit to travel to Mexico City to seek a colonial land grant from the
59
Mexican government.
The Cherokees’ trip to Mexico City took place at an inopportune
time, as a revolution and change in the leadership of Mexico occurred
60
during the spring of 1823. Thus, despite having been promised a
grant of land, “the Mexican colonization laws that were passed in
61
1824 and 1825 failed to include the Cherokees.” Rather, the land
the Cherokees claimed was granted to a “disgruntled” American
colonist who was in the process of inspiring a revolution against the
62
government of Mexico. Chief Fields was angry at the turn of events,
and he threatened to join the Comanches and other tribes in North
Texas resisting Mexican control.63
In 1825, John Dunn Hunter—a writer who had much experience
chronicling the western Indians—arrived at the Cherokees’ village.64
Hunter was keenly interested in Indian affairs, and whatever his true
intentions were in coming to Texas, he was well-liked by Chief Fields.
Fields, in fact, commissioned Hunter to travel to Mexico City in
65
another effort to secure Cherokee title to Texas land. The trip was
unsuccessful, and upon his return, Hunter convinced the Cherokees
that the Mexican government had contempt for them.66 Though the
Cherokees were ready to go to war, Hunter convinced the Tribe to
67
instead join a rebellion incited by Hayden Edwards, a man that had
been granted a contract by the Mexican government to settle families
68
in Texas. Joining Edwards’s short-lived independence surge—which
became known as the “Fredonian Rebellion”—proved to be a
deleterious move for Hunter and Fields because the Mexican army,
joined by a Texas militia commanded by Stephen F. Austin, moved to

59. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 27.
60. HOIG, supra note 47, at 178. For further reading on the history of Mexico, see THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF MEXICO (Michael C. Meyer & William H. Beezley eds., 2000).
61. HOIG, supra note 47, at 179.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 30.
65. HOIG, supra note 47, at 180.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 37 (citing EUGENE C. BARKER, LIFE OF STEPHEN F.
AUSTIN, FOUNDER OF TEXAS, 1793-1836: A CHAPTER IN THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT OF THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN PEOPLE, 148-50 (1925)). See also Archie P. McDonald, Fredonian
Rebellion, in THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/
articles/FF/jcf1.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
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crush the uprising.69 Edwards and his coterie fled to the safety of
70
The
Louisiana, and both Fields and Hunter were assassinated.
Cherokee council had ordered the men to be executed for violating
the community interest to benefit an enemy, which was a decision not
only consistent with tribal law, but also showed the Mexican
government that this momentary intransigency was not a disloyal act
by the Cherokees.71 The strategy proved successful: the Mexican
government commended Bowles and Gatunwali (also known as “Big
72
Mush”) for their prompt action in the affair. In fact, “[t]he Texas
governor ordered the military command to issue a title for a
Cherokee land grant,” but “[b]efore this could be done,
unfortunately, the governor died and the military command was
changed.”73
Bowles resumed his post as head of the Cherokee people, and he
persevered in his efforts to secure title to land.74 In the summer of
1833, Bowles guided a party of Cherokees to Saltillo—the capital of
Texas—where he was assured that the land issue would soon be
resolved.75 Eventually, the government offered the Cherokees land
through a resolution, but rather than granting them title to the land in
East Texas that the tribe occupied, the land offered was farther north,
and was selected strategically to defend Texas against the
76
Understandably, the Cherokees rejected the land
Comanches.
77
grant. Moreover, by 1835 Texas was in “a state of confusion and
uncertainty,”78 where “[t]alk of revolution was on every tongue.”79 In
short, “a new player” had arrived to take part in the impending Texas
80
revolution: Sam Houston, who was a close friend of Chief Bowles.

69. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 180-81.
70. Id. at 181.
71. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 47.
72. Id.
73. HOIG, supra note 47, at 183.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 69.
77. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 183.
78. Id.
79. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 57.
80. HOIG, supra note 47, at 183. In fact, Sam Houston and Chief Bowles had formerly lived
within seven miles of one another in Tennessee. Id.
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Houston had Indian roots, and was sympathetic to the plight of the
81
Cherokees.
In November of 1835, delegates convened at San Felipe de
Austin to establish a provisional government for those seeking
82
This convention—referred to as the
independence in Texas.
“Consultation”—drafted the “Plan and Powers of the Provisional
Government of Texas” (Plan and Powers), which created the
positions of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and General Council,
established a judiciary, and spelled out the powers of the provisional
83
government. After completing the Plan and Powers, a resolution
known as the “Solemn Declaration” was issued on November 13, and
it was unanimously adopted by the fifty-four members of the
84
Consultation. The parts pertinent for the Cherokees read as follows:
Be it solemnly decreed . . . [t]hat the Cherokee Indians, and their
associate bands, . . . have derived their just claims to lands . . . from
the government of Mexico, from whom we have also derived our
rights . . . .
We solemnly declare, that the boundaries of the claims . . . to the
land is as follows, to wit: lying north of the San Antonio road and
the Neches, and west of the Angelina and Sabine Rivers.
We solemnly declare, that the governor and the general council,
immediately on its organization, shall appoint commissioners to
treat with the said Indians, to establish the definite boundary of
their territory, and secure their confidence and friendship.
We solemnly declare, that we will guarantee them the peaceful
85
enjoyment of their rights to the lands, as we do our own.

81. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 57. Sam Houston was made a citizen of the Cherokee
Nation of Arkansas in 1829. Id.
82. HOIG, supra note 47, at 184. In order to better comprehend the governmental structure
of the Republic of Texas during its bid for independence, one can view Texas as having
proceeded through four governments: an initial Permanent Council, a Consultation, a
Provisional Government and General Council, and the Constitutional Convention of 1836. See
John Cornyn, The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to Statehood, 26 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1089, 1119 (1995). It is not possible to address each stage individually in this concise
historical summary, but the reader is invited to explore this topic further.
83. See JOURNALS OF THE CONSULTATION HELD AT SAN FELIPE DE AUSTIN, OCTOBER
16, 1835 (1838), reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS 505 (George P. Findlay & D. E.
Simmons eds., 1906) [hereinafter JOURNALS]. See also Plan and Powers of the Provisional
Government of Texas, reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS, supra, at 908, available at
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/1836ppindex.html [hereinafter Plan and Powers].
For a comprehensive account of the early judiciary’s composition in the Republic of Texas and
thereafter, see James W. Paulsen, The Judges of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas, 65
TEX. L. REV. 305 (1986).
84. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 60-61. See also JOURNALS, supra note 83, at 546.
85. JOURNALS, supra note 83, at 546.
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Houston, the newly elected commander-in-chief of the Texas army,
supported the resolution and was thrilled after it was unanimously
86
approved.
Later that month, Houston and two other emissaries began
87
negotiating a treaty with the Cherokees. The agreement—known as
the “Treaty between Texas Commissioners and the Cherokee
Indians” (Treaty)—was the first pact negotiated by the nascent Texas
government, and was signed on February 23, 1836.88 Houston and
Colonel John Forbes signed for the Texas government, and Chief
Bowles, Big Mush, and six others signed for the Cherokees,
Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, Quapaws, Buloies, Iowanes,
Alabamas, Coushattas, Caddoes of Neches, Tamocuttakes, and
89
Untanguous. The Treaty specified lands to be allocated and settled
by the Indians, which they agreed to locate within, and also
established a lasting peace between the Texas government and the
signatory tribes.90 On February 29, Houston transmitted the Treaty to
Texas Governor Henry Smith for presentation to the Consultation.91
Unfortunately, no formal ratifying action was taken on the Treaty
92
during this turbulent period, as the Texans were in the midst of

86. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 61.
87. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 70.
88. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 63.
89. Id.
90. Treaty between Texas Commissioners and the Cherokee Indians arts. I-II, Rep. of
Tex.-Cherokees, Feb. 23, 1836, reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS, supra note 83, at
204, available at http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/treasures/giants/cherokee-1.html [hereinafter Treaty].
Article II of the Treaty delimited the boundaries of the Cherokee lands as follows:
It is agreed and declared that the before named Tribes, or Bands shall form one
community, and that they shall have and possess the lands, within the following
bounds. Towit,—laying West of the San Antonio road, and beginning on the West, at
the point where the said road crosses the River Angeline, and running up said river,
until it reaches the mouth of the first large creek, (below the great Shawanee Village)
emptying into the said River from the north east, thence running with said creek, to its
main source, and from thence, a due north line to the Sabine River, and with said river
west—then starting where the San Antonio road crosses the Angeline river, and with
the said road to the point where it crosses the Naches river and thence running up the
east side of said river, in a North West direction.
Id.
91. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 73.
92. Id. at 73-74 (explaining that the Consultation did not consider the Treaty); id. at 75
(explaining that the Constitutional Convention of 1836 did not take action to ratify the Treaty).
The historian Emmet Starr offers an alternative view to Everett. More particularly, Starr
explains that the Treaty was delivered to the Republic of Texas provisional government, as per
instructions, on February 29, 1836; the documents were subsequently surrendered to the
Constitutional Convention on March 11. STARR, supra note 18, at 210. If the government did
not approve of the Treaty, which was the purpose of the Consultation, there appears to be no
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drafting the “Texas Declaration of Independence,” which was
93
completed on March 2, 1836, and the subsequent “Constitution of
the Republic of Texas,” which was completed on March 17, 1836.94
Even so, the bond of friendship between Chief Bowles and Houston
95
gave Bowles confidence that Texas would honor the Treaty.
On April 21, 1836, the Mexican army was defeated at the historic
96
As the Texas revolution concluded and
Battle of San Jacinto.
Houston was elected the new President of the Republic of Texas, he
continued to support the Treaty.97 Yet, there was opposition to the
Treaty among the Texas citizenry because of general white prejudice
against Indians, as well as contempt flowing from rumors that the
Indians were organizing to aid Mexico.98 Notwithstanding this
opposition, Houston submitted the Treaty to the Senate for
ratification under the country’s new constitution.99 In the fall of 1837,
the Senate debated the Treaty at great length, but decided that it was
100
The Senate reasoned that the provisional
null and void.
government had exceeded its powers in negotiating the Treaty, which
was not only detrimental to the Republic of Texas, but also violated
the legal rights of many citizens.101 Moreover, the land encompassed
under the Treaty was already subject to numerous settled land titles
and many more were in the process of fulfillment.102 Houston was
outraged at the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Treaty, and he moved
forward with his promise to Bowles to mark off a boundary line
between the Cherokees and whites.103 This action was Houston’s last

record of it (though Starr acknowledges that the government and army were in a perilous state
of affairs). See id.
93. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS para. 1 (1836),
available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/1836dindex.html.
94. REP. OF TEX. CONST. OF 1836 [hereinafter TEX. CONST.], available at
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/1836cindex.html.
95. HOIG, supra note 47, at 184. See also CLARKE, supra note 12, at 67.
96. L.W. Kemp, Battle of San Jacinto, in THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE,
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/SS/qes4.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2006).
97. HOIG, supra note 47, at 184-85.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 185.
101. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 72.
102. Id.
103. HOIG, supra note 47, at 185.
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for the Cherokees; his term expired and he was replaced by President
104
Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar.
Lamar had migrated to Texas from Georgia, where the “Old
Nation Cherokees” had been severely treated, and he was adamant
105
that the Cherokees must be forced out of Texas. With the support
of the white population, Lamar wasted little time before alleging that
the Cherokees were plotting with the Mexicans to overthrow the
Texas government, and that an Indian uprising was a serious
danger.106 Lamar employed these pretexts as justification to send
107
troops into Cherokee territory. Understandably, Chief Bowles was
angered by these accusations, and he threatened to fight if the troops
remained on Cherokee lands. But Lamar was unrelenting in his
decision to stay on, and he sent word to Bowles that the Cherokees
would be removed from Texas by force if necessary.108 Lamar then
sent commissioners to meet with the Cherokees, and an agreement
109
The terms
was proposed for the Cherokees’ eviction from Texas.
were unfavorable to the Cherokees, offering de minimus
compensation for land improvements and belongings that would be
left behind, and demanding that the Cherokees surrender the bulk of
their firearms and leave Texas under an armed escort.110 Bowles did
not sign the agreement, thereby setting off the “Cherokee War.”111
When the dust settled, it was clear that the Texas army had easily
defeated the Cherokees. Eighty-three year-old Chief Bowles lost his
life; he was killed by a gunshot to the head at close range.112 Bowles’
corpse was mutilated on the battlefield in a ghoulish manner—strips
of flesh were cut from his back to be used as reins for a horse, and his
scalp was also taken.113 The captured Cherokees were eventually sent
to Indian territory, while the others fled to Louisiana, Mexico,114 or

104. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 76.
105. HOIG, supra note 47, at 186-87.
106. Id.
107. See id.; see also STARR, supra note 18, at 213 (“Pretext after pretext was sought in order
to find some excuse for the sin the government [of Texas] was about to commit upon an
innocent [Cherokee] people.”).
108. HOIG, supra note 47, at 187.
109. Id.
110. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 98-100 (quoting the articles from the agreement that was
submitted to the Texas Cherokees).
111. Id. at 105-06.
112. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 108.
113. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 110.
114. HOIG, supra note 47, at 190.
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the forests of East Texas.115 When Houston learned about the
Cherokees’ slaughter and the death of Chief Bowles, he condemned
116
Regrettably,
the actions publicly, despite threats against his life.
Houston’s public outrage occurred after the tragic climax to the
Cherokees’ struggle. Just a few years later, the incident seemed long
past when the Republic of Texas was annexed by the United States in
1845.117
II. TREATY LAW
To determine whether the United States should have succeeded
the Republic of Texas’s obligations under the pact with the
Cherokees, the legally binding nature of the Treaty must be
considered. This point is critical because the Texas Senate concluded
118
Not only was this decision vexing to
that the Treaty was invalid.
Houston and others in 1837, but it also disturbs modern legal scholars
119
In fact, historians have frequently averred that the Treaty
today.
was a legally binding document that was properly concluded by the
Texas provisional government. For instance, a historian of the era—
Henderson Yoakum—argued that the Texas Senate’s claim that the
Consultation lacked the authority to pledge land is preposterous.120
He continued by stating that the “ink was scarcely dry on the treaty

115. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 108-09. See also Lipscomb, supra note 11 (“Some
Cherokees continued to live a fugitive existence in Texas . . . .”).
116. HOIG, supra note 47, at 190. When Sam Houston was elected to a second presidential
term in 1841, he inaugurated a peace policy with the Indians, and treaties were negotiated in
1843 and 1844. Lipscomb, supra note 11.
117. TEX. CONST. OF 1845, reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS, supra note 83, at
1069, available at http://www.tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/1845index.html. See also
generally, S.S. McKay, Constitution of 1845, in THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE,
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/CC/mhc3.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
For an analysis as to whether the annexation of Texas was Constitutional, compare Ralph H.
Brock, The Republic of Texas is No More: An Answer to the Claim that Texas was
Unconstitutionally Annexed to the United States, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 679 (1997), with Jennifer
M. L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis of the Illegal
Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawaii’s Annexation, and Possible Reparations, 17 U.
HAW. L. REV. 463 (1995).
118. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 88.
119. See generally Victoria Sutton, American Indian Law—Elucidating Constitutional Law,
37 TULSA L. REV. 539, 545-46 (2001) (discussing how the United States recognizes preConstitutional treaties with successor-in-interest logic, while a different relationship arises in the
case of the treaty between the Republic of Texas and the Texas Cherokees).
120. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78 (quoting 2 HENDERSON YOAKUM, HISTORY OF TEXAS
FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT IN 1685 TO ITS ANNEXATION TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1846, at
266 (1855)).
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paper” when Texas began violating the Treaty’s terms: an accusation
that land surveyors were in Cherokee territory marking off land for
121
settlement long before the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty.
Although the facts appear to support the assertion of bad faith
on the part of the Republic of Texas, a proper determination of the
merit of the Cherokees’ claim can only be ascertained by employing a
systematic legal analysis of the Treaty. First, the analysis must
determine whether the Treaty was a binding agreement that should
have been honored under domestic and international law. If the
Treaty was indeed valid, a second and more complex question must
be tackled: whether the United States should have succeeded to the
Treaty after it annexed the Republic of Texas pursuant to the
international law of state succession.
A. Treaty Validity Under Domestic Law
122

When Sam Houston became President of Texas again in 1842,
he wrote to Texas Attorney General George Whitfield Terrell to get
an opinion on the Cherokees’ title to the disputed property in East
123
Texas. Terrell believed the Treaty was valid for multiple reasons:
first, the treaty was signed in good faith; and second, the provisional
government was the only government active in Texas at the time of
the Treaty’s signing, and thus it was the government de facto.124 This
conclusion jibed with Houston’s belief that the Consultation had full
power to treat with the Cherokees, and to assert that it did not was
nothing more than a pretext to dishonor an otherwise valid
agreement.125 Upon carefully reviewing the Plan and Powers of the
provisional government, it appears that both Houston and Terrell
were correct in their conclusions.
When the Consultation issued the “Solemn Declaration” in 1835,
this action represented more than a simple good faith gesture aimed
126
In reality, the Solemn Declaration was meant to
at the Indians.
121. Id.
122. For further reading on Sam Houston, see RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, SAM HOUSTON
AND THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (2d ed. 2001). See also, RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, GONE TO
TEXAS: A HISTORY OF THE LONE STAR STATE (2003); JAMES L. HALEY, SAM HOUSTON
(2002); MARQUIS JAMES, THE RAVEN: A BIOGRAPHY OF SAM HOUSTON (1988).
123. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78.
124. Id. at 78-79.
125. Id.
126. See id., at 60 (stating that one of the “primary duties” of the provisional government
“was to treat with the Indians regarding their land titles and to secure their friendship if
possible”).
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fulfill the obligations of the provisional government enumerated in
the Plan and Powers. More particularly, Article III of the Plan and
Powers stated: “They [the Governor and General Council] shall have
power, and it is hereby made the duty of the Governor and Council,
to treat with the several tribes of Indians concerning their land claims,
and if possible, to secure their friendship.”127 One of the first
questions that comes to mind when reading this section of the Plan
and Powers is why the Governor and General Council would have
been given a “duty” to treat with the Cherokees and other tribes.
The answer to this query is straightforward: the Texans were
concerned that the Indians would ally with Mexico and fight against
them.128 In fact, had the Cherokees allied with Mexico, Texans may
have lost the Battle of San Jacinto.129
Undoubtedly, the Consultation wanted to settle the Cherokees’
land claim to secure Cherokee allegiance to the Texas cause, or at the
very least, to keep the Cherokees neutral during the coming war with
Mexico.130 The Consultation made their intentions known by crafting
specific language in the Plan and Powers that obliged the provisional
131
government to treat with the Indians, by issuing a grant of territory
to the Cherokees in the resolution known as the Solemn
Declaration,132 and by incorporating the Solemn Declaration into the
133
This aim also clarifies why Houston and two other
Treaty.
emissaries hastily negotiated and executed a binding agreement with
the Cherokees.134 Accordingly, the critical legal inquiry must focus on
the provisional government’s intent in treating with the Cherokees, as
135
the party’s intent determines whether a treaty requires ratification.
Here, the consecutive measures taken by the Texas government
in an effort to treat with the Cherokees, along with its failure to
127. Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III.
128. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 185. Accord EVERETT, supra note 17, at 69-70.
129. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 120.
130. See STARR, supra note 18, at 210 (explaining that Cherokee neutrality was essential
during the Republic of Texas’s struggle for independence).
131. Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III (Article III states that it is “the duty of the
Governor and Council to treat with the several tribes of Indians concerning their Land
Claims . . . .”).
132. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 60-61. See also JOURNALS, supra note 83, at 546-47.
133. See Treaty, supra note 90, pmbl. (“This Treaty is made conformably to a declaration
[the Solemn Declaration] made by the last General Consultation, at St. Felipe, and dated 13th
November A.D. 1835.”).
134. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 184.
135. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 14, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
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include a ratification provision in the Plan and Powers136 and the
137
Treaty, show that there was no overt expectation of Treaty
ratification on the government’s behalf. These points are telling,
especially given that there was no senatorial body in existence to
138
ratify the agreement at the time it was executed.
As such, the
evidence plainly quashes any assertion that Senate ratification was
either intended or required.
In addition, the Plan and Powers provided the provisional
government with a variety of other powers, including the ability “to
contract for loans, . . . to hypothecate the Public Lands, and pledge
the faith of the Country for the security of the payment.”139 Because
the Senate did not question the provisional government’s decisions to
borrow money, or undertake other activities required to secure
Texas’ independence,140 it seems dubious to argue that the provisional
government was not empowered to treat with the Indians; the
141
language in the Plan and Powers was patently clear in this regard.
As such, it seems that Houston may have erred by submitting the
Treaty to the newly established Senate for ratification after Texas
declared its independence.142 He probably assumed that a stamp of
legitimacy would help the Cherokees, but Senate ratification was
neither required nor intended under the Plan and Powers.143
Taken as a whole, these findings support the claim of Treaty
validity by Attorney General Terrell and the historians. The

136. Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III (Article III makes it the duty of the provisional
government to treat with the Indians, though a ratification requirement is not included.).
137. See Treaty, supra note 90. In fact, the terms of the Treaty seem to indicate that the
agreement was to go into effect upon signing. Id. arts. 10-11 (describing precise time limits from
the date of the Treaty within which certain parties must relocate).
138. Compare Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. I, with TEX. CONST., supra note 94, art. I.
139. Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III.
140. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78 (quoting 3 SAM HOUSTON, THE WRITINGS OF SAM
HOUSTON 323-47 (Amelia W. Williams & Eugene C. Parker eds., 1938-43)).
141. Article III of the Plan and Powers states: “They [the General Council] shall have
power, and it is hereby made the duty of the Governor and Council, to treat with the several
tribes of Indians concerning their Land Claims, and if possible, to secure their friendship.” Plan
and Powers, supra note 83, art. III.
142. See id. (The provisional government had full authority to treat with the Cherokees.).
See also generally CLARKE, supra note 12, at 77-79 (explaining that the opinions of historians,
Sam Houston, and Texas Attorney General G.W. Terrell all agree that the provisional
government had the power to treat with the Cherokees).
143. This supposition may explain why Houston made no further attempt to secure the
Senate’s ratification during his term as the first president of the Republic of Texas. See STARR,
supra note 18, at 211. Instead, Houston proceeded in marking off the boundaries of the
Cherokees territory. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 73.
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Republic of Texas was vying for independence, and needed the
Cherokees’ neutrality. To secure this neutrality, the government
crafted targeted language in the Plan and Powers, granted the
Cherokees territory in the Solemn Declaration, and quickly executed
the Treaty, an agreement that neither intended nor required the
Senate’s ratification. As such, the evidence refutes the Texas Senate’s
claims that the Treaty was detrimental to the Republic of Texas and
144
violated the rights of its citizens.
The Treaty simply fulfilled the
provisional government’s obligation to help Texas secure its
independence,145 as did the provisional government’s other acts, which
the Senate did not question. What is more, the Treaty met its
objective: the Cherokees’ neutrality proved to be a significant factor
in Texas winning the war with Mexico.146 Therefore, when all facts
are considered, the Treaty appears to have been a valid agreement
under domestic law.
B. Treaty Validity Under International Law
Beyond basic rules of domestic law, the Republic of Texas
should also have been aware of a key principle under international
law known as “pacta sunt servanda,” which is the idea that states must
keep their word.147 Pacta sunt servanda has been claimed as a basic
norm of the law of nations, with a rich history beyond the modern
148
Thinkers throughout the ages, including Socrates, Plato,
context.
and Cicero, have stressed the concept’s fundamental role in any legal
system.149 Consequently, this norm was far from novel when Texas
negotiated the Treaty, though it was apparently given little
consideration when the Senate decided to abrogate its commitment
under the agreement.150 In any case, the application of this norm
connotes that Texas could not terminate the Treaty without suitable

144. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 71-72.
145. Compare Plan and Powers, supra note 83, with Treaty, supra note 90 (the Treaty
fulfilled this obligation). See generally HOIG, supra note 47, at 184 (discussing the convention
that established the Republic of Texas provisional government and its vow to recognize the
Cherokees’ land claims).
146. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 72-73.
147. Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 567, 567 (1995).
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See generally CLARKE, supra note 12, at 71-73 (discussing the Senate’s decision to
nullify the Treaty).
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justification under international law.151 More specifically, states may
justify abrogating a treaty by any one of three reasons: (1) a breach
of the treaty; (2) a fundamental change in circumstances; or (3) a lack
of capacity to treat.152
First, a state may terminate a treaty when another party has
breached its obligations under the agreement.153 Any breach would of
course not be adequate, since customary international law as well as
the modern Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
Article 60—which codifies this customary principle—holds that a
nation cannot terminate a treaty unless another party has materially
breached a provision essential to the purpose of the treaty.154 In other
words, there can be no treaty termination for an accidental breach or
155
In this case, Texas never alleged that the
a trivial violation.
Cherokees failed to live up to their responsibilities in the Treaty, and
history also has failed to provide such evidence.156 As a result, this
justification does not seem applicable.
Second, a treaty may be terminated under the doctrine of
fundamental change in circumstances, known under international law
157
The idea behind this right is that the
as “rebus sic stantibus.”
conditions that led to the conclusion of a treaty have changed so
fundamentally that it is appropriate for any party to unilaterally
terminate the agreement.158 One such condition that would be
considered a fundamental change in circumstances would be the
159
For example, the United States offered this
outbreak of war.
justification for terminating an international agreement on shipping
load restrictions during World War II.160

151. See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 38 (2001)
(discussing justifications for treaty abrogation).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.; VCLT, supra note 135, art. 60.
155. BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 38.
156. President Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar claimed the Cherokees were threatening to
join forces with Mexico in an effort to overthrow the Republic of Texas government, and as a
result, they would never be permitted to establish a permanent and sovereign jurisdiction within
Texas. HOIG, supra note 47, at 187. However, these alleged events transpired after the Senate
refused to ratify the Treaty. Id. at 185. What is more, Lamar had little evidence to prove his
claim. Id. at 186-87.
157. BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 38.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. The agreement that the U.S. Attorney General terminated was the 1930
International Load Lines Convention. Id.
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In the modern context, Article 62 of the VCLT has sought to
161
limit the use of rebus sic stantibus to a limited set of circumstances,
and it explicitly forbids exercising this right in the case of agreements
that establish a boundary, or where the party invoking the right has
162
contributed to the changed circumstances by its own violation. The
VCLT does not address the issue of war, as the termination of a
treaty by war has always been a matter resolved by customary
163
international law.
When applying this principle to Texas in the
1830s, there does not appear to be any evidence that a fundamental
change in circumstances occurred during the period from 1836 to 1837
that would justify unilateral Treaty termination (aside from the fact
that after winning the Battle of San Jacinto, Texas no longer needed
the Cherokees’ neutrality). Hence, this reason appears unpersuasive.
Finally, there is one remaining justification that Texas could have
proffered when it abrogated the Treaty: that the Cherokees, the
Republic of Texas, or both lacked the capacity to enter the
agreement. Unfortunately, there is no hard and fast rule for
determining the competence of less than fully-sovereign states to
engage in treaty-making.164 Rather, the outcome depends exclusively
on the facts of the case in question.165 Notwithstanding the principle’s
lack of clarity, the Cherokees probably had the capacity to treat with
the Republic of Texas. This argument is supported by ample
historical fact: during the nineteenth century and before, it was
common practice to consider agreements between colonizing settlers
and indigenous peoples, such as the American Indians in North
America, as treaties, even though indigenous peoples do not
necessarily constitute a “state” as the term is used in the modern
context.166 Thus, one can readily make a prima facie case for the
Cherokees’ capacity to treat.

161. See VCLT, supra note 135, art. 62.
162. Id. art. 62(2)(a).
163. BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 39.
164. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 595 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992) (1905).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 595 n.2. In addition, many of these agreements are still accepted as treaties under
domestic law, even though they may not have this standing in the international realm. Id. See
also GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ISRAELIPALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 92-94 (2000) (discussing how early colonial practice in
Great Britain, New Zealand, and the United States adhered to the view that indigenous peoples
had treaty-making capacity); Wiessner, supra note 147, at 591 (discussing commitments arising
from Indian treaties as international obligations).
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In the case of the less-than-fully-sovereign Republic of Texas, its
capacity to treat is probably best understood by examining the criteria
for statehood that were codified under the “1933 Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States” (Montevideo), at
least to the extent that the Montevideo codified pre-existing
customary international law.167 Article 1 of the Montevideo provides
that “states” should possess the following:
(a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity
to enter into relations with other states.168
After a cursory
examination of these criteria, one can convincingly argue that the
Republic of Texas met the requirements of a permanent population
and a defined territory. Moreover, Texas had a fully functioning,
stable, and effective government169 beginning with the Consultation in
170
Thus, the remaining question concerns the
November of 1835.
Republic of Texas’s capacity to enter into relations with extant states;
this criterion requires that the government possess both requisite
constitutional authority and accompanying “political, technical, and
financial capabilities.”171 Although the Plan and Powers seems to
have provided the provisional government with only limited ability to
enter into international agreements, it did include a modicum of such

167. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo]. The Montevideo criteria support the
declarative theory of statehood, which holds that a state’s existence depends solely upon
meeting the objective factors established under international law. See Kelly Malone, The Rights
of Newly Emerging Democratic States Prior to International Recognition and the Serbo-Croation
Conflict, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 81, 91-93 (1992). The recognition of an emerging entity—
like the Republic of Texas—by an established state simply indicates that state’s willingness to
treat the emerging entity as if it possesses international standing. Id. In other words, statehood
arises independently of recognition by other states. Id. In contrast, the constitutive theory of
statehood, which is the minority position, holds that it is the act of recognition by states—the
constitutive act—that establishes legal statehood for an emerging entity. Id.
168. Malone, supra note 167, at 91-93. Note that in practice (meaning customary
international law), the third and fourth characteristics—government and capacity to enter into
relations with other states—are often combined into a single characteristic: authority.
Professor Joel H. Samuels, Lecture at the University of Michigan Law School (Jan. 13, 2002).
Since the 1960s, the requirement of democracy has emerged as a fifth characteristic under
customary international law. Malone, supra note 167, at 86-87.
169. See generally Malone, supra note 167 at 84-85 (discussing the requirement of a stable
and effective government for statehood under international law).
170. See supra Part I. The historian Emmet Starr explained that the Republic of Texas
inaugurated an independent government with the Consultation, while the Cherokees remained
a separate and quasi-independent nation, and were treated as such by Texas. STARR, supra
note 18, at 224.
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 201 cmt. e (1987).
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power and capability,172 and specifically enumerated the government’s
173
duty to treat with the Indians. As such, this criterion appears to be
satisfied. Nevertheless, some commentators might assert that the
provisional government’s limited constitutional authority and
technical and financial constraints during this period cast doubt upon
it having met the last statehood trait. Accordingly, it is critical to note
that there is some flexibility in meeting the statehood requirements
under international law—the criteria are not absolute.174 This point
explains not only why the Montevideo’s language holds that states
“should” possess the aforesaid characteristics,175 but also why an
agreement executed between an emerging state and a sovereign state
has been held as a valid international agreement from the date of the
emerging state’s independence.176 Therefore, both the Cherokees and
the Republic of Texas seem to have had the capacity to treat.
In summary, based on the analysis in this Article, the Treaty
appears to be valid under both domestic and international law. It was
properly entered into by the Republic of Texas provisional
government under the Plan and Powers, and aside from providing a
ceremonial and legitimacy-enhancing aspect to the process,
ratification by the Texas Senate was neither intended nor required.
Moreover, pursuant to the well known principle of pacta sunt
servanda, Texas was required to fulfill its obligations to the
Cherokees under the agreement. Finally, there does not appear to
172. See Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III (“[T]hey shall pass no laws except such as,
in their opinion, the emergency of the country requires . . . they shall pursue the most effective
and energetic measures to rid the country of her enemies, and place her in the best possible
state of defence . . . .”).
173. Id. (“They shall have power, and it is hereby made the duty of the Governor and
Council, to treat with the several tribes of Indians.”).
174. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (3d ed. 1979).
175. See Montevideo, supra note 167, art. 1. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 174, at 74
(explaining that Albania was recognized as a state even though its frontiers had yet to be firmly
established).
176. See State v. Eliasov 1967 (4) SA 583 (A) (S. Afr.). In this case, shortly before the
dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, one of the entities that was
about to emerge—Southern Rhodesia—executed an agreement with South Africa that was held
to be a valid international agreement from the date of the Federation’s dissolution. Id. This
case reflects the modern view that emerging states are considered successor states and therefore
are “equal heirs to the rights and obligations of the predecessor state.” See Paul Williams &
Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: The Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 355, 362 (2001). See also WATSON, supra note 166, at 97 (discussing binding
international agreements between the United States and the emerging states of Micronesia and
Palau). See generally id. at 95-99 (discussing numerous cases where state actors—including
Britain, Portugal, France, and the Arab States—have entered agreements with non-state actors
such as liberation movements).
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have been any justification for treaty abrogation: there is no evidence
of the occurrence of a material breach or fundamental change in
circumstances, and both parties possessed the capacity to treat. As a
result, in all likelihood, the Treaty remains a valid instrument.
III. STATE SUCCESSION
Because the Treaty between the Republic of Texas and the
Cherokees is probably valid under both domestic and international
law, especially when one considers that it appears to meet the rigors
of contemporary international legal doctrine, the remaining question
is whether the United States should have succeeded to the Treaty
when it annexed Texas in 1845. Admittedly, this question is not one
of first impression in the legal community. In fact, the Texas
Cherokees have pursued an action for the Treaty’s breach on three
prior occasions.177 Thus, before addressing the international law of
state succession, these prior cases will be briefly considered. The first
two actions that the Cherokees pursued can be quickly summarized,
while the third action, which involved an administrative tribunal,
requires more extensive treatment.
A. Prior Lawsuits by the Texas Cherokees
In the Cherokees’ first action, approximately nine hundred heirs
hired legal counsel to represent them in a $100 million suit against the
state of Texas in 1915, where they requested compensation for the
territory lost as a result of the Republic of Texas’s breach of the
178
Counsel petitioned the Supreme Court in 1920 for
Treaty.
permission to sue, but the Court denied the request based upon
179
authority in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim because the
Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state within the meaning of the
180
U.S. Constitution.
Nevertheless, the Cherokees did not abandon
their quest for restitution. In a second case, which occurred in 1924,
the Tribe’s counsel enlisted the help of the Commissioner for Indian

177. In March 1964, Earl Boyd Pierce, General Counsel for the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma, presented a plan to the Texas Government to settle the Texas Cherokees’ claim; the
proposal was rejected. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 122-25. Because the plan was offered by the
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, and not the Texas Cherokees, it is not considered here. Id.
178. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 120.
179. Texas-Cherokees v. Texas, 257 U.S. 615 (1921) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1 (1831)).
180. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.
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Affairs to pursue the claim.181 Unfortunately, this effort also failed to
182
make any progress.
The Cherokees filed their third action alleging breach of the
Treaty in 1948, but this time the claim was against the U.S.
183
The Cherokees had
government for $5 million in compensation.
finally found an audience for their claim, but it was not a traditional
court of law; rather, the Cherokees appeared before a now defunct
administrative tribunal known as the Indian Claims Commission
(ICC), which was created by Congress in 1946 to address grievances
184
between Indian Tribes and the United States. Unfortunately for the
Cherokees, the ICC poorly adjudicated their claim.185
There are no bright spots in the ICC opinion for the Cherokees,
as the court quashed all the claims that the Tribe promulgated. From
the outset, the ICC unequivocally disapproved of the Cherokees’
claim, stating their opinion by hastily narrating the Texas Cherokees’
186
history, and citing Western Cherokee v. United States, which held
that an organization of Indians created to pursue a claim is not a
“tribal organization” in the sense of the term that would permit
Indians to pursue claims under the Indian Claims Commission Act.187
More importantly, the ICC seemed to unduly emphasize the point
that the Cherokees that had relocated to “parent tribes” in Oklahoma
never attempted to return to Texas or to reclaim their distinct status

181. EVERETT, supra note 17, at 120.
182. Id.
183. Texas-Cherokees v. United States, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n 522 (1953).
184. The Indian Claims Commission (ICC) was an administrative tribunal created in 1946,
and abolished in 1978. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (omitted
from 25 U.S.C. § 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30, 1978). For further reading on
the ICC, see generally H.D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN
CLAIMS COMMISSION (1990).
185. See infra (discussing the ICC opinion); see also generally Richard J. Ansson, Jr., The
Indian Claims Commission: Did the American Indians Really Have Their Day in Court?, 23 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 207 (1998) (discussing various problems with the ICC, including evidentiary and
jurisprudential issues with claims, commissioner ignorance of Indian culture, lawyers who
poorly represented tribes, and the tenacity with which the Department of Justice litigated
against the Indians); Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Court of the Conqueror, 41 AM.
U. L. REV. 753, 771-73 (1992) (exploring the ICC and reasons for its adoption of the adversary
model); JOHN R. WUNDER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 111-15 (1994) (discussing the
establishment and operation of the Indian Claims Commission, including key points such as:
how Indians were not treated equally because they had to obtain permission to hire their
lawyers; how the Department of Justice acted reprehensibly, employing outrageous litigation
tactics; and how the ICC ultimately represented a miserable failure for American Indians).
186. See Texas-Cherokees, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n at 523-27.
187. Id. at 529 (citing Western Cherokee v. United States, 1 Indian Cl. Comm’n 165 (1949)).
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as a separate tribe.188 This logic was patently flawed because the ICC
ignored three key issues: (1) there were Cherokees massacred in
189
190
Texas; (2) there were Cherokees who did not join other tribes;
and (3) there were likely Cherokees spurned to regroup as a separate
tribe, but who lacked the financial resources to pursue the
endeavor.191
To make their case, the Cherokees averred that the United
States was under an obligation to help them pursue a claim for
192
payment from the state of Texas for violation of the Treaty, and
also that the United States was bound to deal honestly and fairly with
the Indians because of the general fiduciary relationship existing
between the Indians and the U.S. government.193 The ICC readily
dismissed these claims. First, the ICC stated that according to the
holding in League v. De Young, it was strictly the province of the state
of Texas alone to decide whether it would honor debts from the
former Republic of Texas.194 Second, in addressing the fiduciary

188. See id. at 528-29.
189. See supra Part I (discussing the Cherokee War). See also generally Indian Relations, in
THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/
II/bzi1.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) (“Mirabeau B. Lamar, who followed Houston as
president, had neither experience with nor sympathy for the Indians; he wanted to destroy them
or drive them from Texas.”); MARK M. CARROLL, HOMESTEADS UNGOVERNABLE: FAMILIES,
SEX, RACE, AND THE LAW IN FRONTIER TEXAS, 1823-1860, 33 (2001) (explaining that President
Lamar’s policy of Indian removal was based on the belief that Indians were “irredeemably
primitive and unassimilable”); CLARKE, supra note 12, at 76 (discussing how President Lamar’s
cabinet boasted they would “kill off Houston’s pet Indians”); EVERETT, supra note 17, at 100
(describing President Lamar as “an inveterate enemy of the Cherokees”); DOUGLAS V. MEED,
COMANCHE 1800-1874 (2003) (describing how President Lamar favored a policy of Indian
extermination).
190. See EVERETT, supra note 17, at 108-14; Hicks, supra note 11.
191. See generally Alan L. Sorkin, The Economic Basis of Indian Life, 436 ANNALS OF THE
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1978); ALAN L. SORKIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND
FEDERAL AID (1971). See also generally Native Americans Still Poorest in the United States,
INDIANZ.COM, Aug. 30, 2006, http://indianz.com/News/2006/015687.asp (discussing 2005 U.S.
Census Bureau data on American Indian poverty).
192. Texas-Cherokees, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n at 534.
193. Id. at 532.
194. Id. at 534 (citing League v. De Young, 52 U.S. 185 (1850)). What may be of interest to
the reader is that Texas appeared to follow League in 1964 when Attorney General Waggoner
Carr issued an opinion to Governor John Connally regarding a newly proposed settlement of
the Cherokees’ claim. See CLARKE, supra note 17, at 123-25. In short, Carr concluded that the
Cherokees’ claim was against the former Republic of Texas, and based on his analysis, the state
of Texas did not intend to honor any such claims that had not been established by 1876. Id.
What also may be of interest, regarding the ICC opinion, is the ICC’s odd attempt to draw an
analogy between the Cherokee case and Wichita Indians v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 378 (1927).
Texas-Cherokees, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n at 530-31. In that case, the Wichita Indians were suing
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relationship that the United States owed the Indians, the ICC stated:
“[I]t will be remembered that the plaintiffs voluntarily left this
country and became inhabitants of a foreign state . . . thus severing
their right to the protection of this government.”195 Both of these
rulings were incorrect.
First, the ICC misinterpreted the League v. De Young opinion in
which the U.S. Supreme Court was unconcerned with treaty law, state
succession, or indigenous peoples, but was instead focused on the
right of the former Republic of Texas to repudiate forged and
196
fraudulent land titles. In this case, the Court held that the State of
Texas alone had the authority to decide whether it would
acknowledge land titles held by its citizens.197 Hence, League was
inapplicable to the Cherokees’ claim. Second, the ICC’s assertion
that the Cherokees voluntarily left U.S. territory, and thereby
forfeited fiduciary protection owed to them by the United States, is
terribly misguided because the colonists encroached and forced the
Tribe to leave the United States.198 More particularly, the Cherokees
moved to preserve some semblance of their traditional way of life,
and not because of any prior or burgeoning allegiance to a foreign
state.199 Furthermore, the Cherokees were subsequently driven by
force out of this “foreign” country—the Republic of Texas200—which
201
Thus, the ICC’s argument
shortly thereafter became a U.S. state.
cannot stand because it ignores critical facts surrounding the
Cherokees’ resettlement.

for the value of 5,200,000 acres of land that they lost as a result of the United States relocating
the Tribe from the state of Texas to a reservation. Id. It is unclear how a case of U.S. Indian
removal from a state to a reservation is related to a case involving treaty abrogation and state
succession under international law.
195. Texas-Cherokees, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n at 533.
196. 52 U.S. at 202-03.
197. Id. at 203.
198. See, e.g., THE REMOVAL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION: MANIFEST DESTINY OR
NATIONAL DISHONOR 2 (Louis Filler & Allen Guttman eds., 1962) (“Those of its members
who preferred the life of hunters moved away to the Far West, while the bulk of the [Cherokee]
tribe remaining settled down to the pursuit of agriculture.”); HOIG, supra note 47, at 113
(“[S]ome of the Western Cherokees were already considering moving farther away from the
mountains or to Mexico’s province of Texas to escape once again from the advancing tide of
white intruders.”). See also WILSON LUMPKIN, THE REMOVAL OF THE CHEROKEE INDIANS
FROM GEORGIA (Arno Press 1969) (1907); ROBERTSON, supra note 1.
199. See generally HOIG, supra note 47, at 101-13.
200. See id., at 186-87. Accord CLARKE, supra note 12, at 98-101; EVERETT, supra note 17,
at 104-08.
201. See generally TEX. CONST. OF 1845, supra note 117.
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To recapitulate, the Cherokees’ first two actions for breach of
the Treaty failed because the Tribe found no audience, while the third
action was poorly adjudicated by the ICC. In particular, the ICC
misinterpreted and misapplied case precedent, and chose to ignore
key historical facts required to properly adjudicate the claim.
Additionally, the ICC should have considered the international law of
state succession as persuasive authority, as the next section of this
Article will demonstrate. As a result, the Cherokees have yet to
receive a fair and balanced hearing on their claim.
B. The Law of State Succession
While state succession is an amorphous term, it can be defined as
occurring when a former state becomes extinct, in whole or in part,
and a new state replaces it.202 More specifically, state succession
comes about when there has been a fundamental transformation in
the state itself; it does not result from a mere change in government.203
A change in the identity of a state can happen for a variety of reasons,
including annexation, territorial cession, merger, decolonization, or
dissolution.204 Whatever the cause, an identity change is a critical
component of a state succession, as it determines whether the
successor state begins life anew—“tabula rasa”—meaning the
successor state succeeds to no rights or obligations of the predecessor
state, or in the alternative, the successor state is responsible for all the
prior obligations and liabilities of the predecessor state.205 As such,
the only proper legal generalization that can be made about a state
succession is that the nature of the change in a state’s identity and the
type of issue involved will determine the legal consequences.206
In the case at hand, the Republic of Texas ceased to exist when it
was annexed by the United States in 1845: the annexation produced a
207
Thus, because this
fundamental change in the state’s identity.
Article previously concluded that the Treaty was in all likelihood a

202. Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Matthew James Kemner, The Enduring Political Nature
of Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest for Objective Standards, 17 U. PA.
J. INT’L ECON. L. 753, 756 (1996).
203. Michael John Volkovitsch, Note, Righting Wrongs: Towards a New Theory of State
Succession to Responsibility for International Delicts, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2164 (1992).
204. Id.
205. Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 202, at 783.
206. BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 58.
207. See Volkovitsch, supra note 203, at 1264 (noting annexation as one event that changes a
state’s identity).
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binding agreement between the Republic of Texas and the
Cherokees, the remaining question is whether the United States
should have succeeded to the obligation of the predecessor state. The
ICC held that the United States did not have to assume the obligation
in its 1953 decision. However, the ICC opinion failed to address the
international law of state succession.208 Three legal principles merit
consideration before one can fully understand the implications of the
ICC’s mistake: (1) the international law on state succession; (2) the
behavior of the United States during colonization, prior annexation
cases, and the post-Civil War period; and (3) the policy views on state
succession promulgated by the United States in the global
community.
1. The International Law of State Succession. When the United
States annexed the Republic of Texas, Texas was merged into the
United States. At that precise moment of annexation, the Republic
of Texas ceased to be a distinct nation, and instead became part of a
209
larger state.
In order to better understand the rights and responsibilities of
the United States after this annexation, one would expect to apply the
contemporary codification of international principles of state
succession: the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect
210
of Treaties (VCSST). However, the United States has chosen not to
subscribe to the VCSST, instead choosing to follow the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law (Restatement), which more closely
reflects the views promulgated in the VCLT.211
Thus, the
Restatement is the more appropriate doctrine to apply. The
pertinent section in the Restatement reads:
Subject to agreement between predecessor and successor states,
responsibility for the public debt of the predecessor, and rights and
obligations under its contracts, remain with the predecessor state,
except . . . (b) where a state is absorbed by another state, the public

208. See Texas-Cherokess v. United States, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n 522, 522-35 (1953) (The
opinion of the Commission contains no discussion of state succession doctrine.).
209. See Volkovitsch, supra note 203, at 1264 (noting annexation as one event that changes a
state’s identity).
210. For a critique of the failings of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties in comporting with actual state practice, see Sari T. Korman, Note, The
1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: An Inadequate Response
to the Issue of State Succession, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 174 (1992).
211. Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 202, at 783.
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debt, and rights and obligations under contracts of the absorbed
212
state, pass to the absorbing state.”

The Republic of Texas was the “absorbed state,” and land that Texas
promised the Cherokees is akin to a “former debt” of the predecessor
state. As such, if the United States were allowed to nullify the debt
owed to the Cherokees, the United States would be unlawfully
enriched by obtaining land already ceded to another entity. This
conclusion also jibes with the more contemporary VCSST: under
Article 11, a state succession does not affect a boundary established
by a treaty, and Article 12 ensures that a state succession does not
affect obligations relating to the use of any territory for the benefit of
a foreign state (where “state” implies the Texas Cherokees).213 Thus,
the international law of state succession probably answers that the
United States should have succeeded to the Treaty.
2. Behavior of the United States—Colonization, Prior
Annexation Cases, and Post-Civil War. The historical behavior of the
United States during colonization, prior annexation cases, and the
post-Civil War era contradicts its decision not to assume the Treaty.
First, consider the behavior of the United States during the colonial
period, which was consistent with state succession principles.
Presently, the United States remains subject to agreements between

212. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 209 (1987). Section 209 states:
(1) Subject to agreement between predecessor and successor states, title to state
property passes as follows:
(a) where part of the territory of a state becomes territory of another state,
property of the predecessor state located in that territory passes to the successor
state;
(b) where a state is absorbed by another state, property of the absorbed state,
wherever located, passes to the absorbing state;
(c) where part of a state becomes a separate state, property of the predecessor
state located in the territory of the new state passes to the new state.
(2) Subject to agreement between predecessor and successor states, responsibility for
the public debt of the predecessor, and rights and obligations under its contracts,
remain with the predecessor state, except as follows:
(a) where part of the territory of a state becomes territory of another state, local
public debt, and the rights and obligations of the predecessor state under contracts
relating to that territory, are transferred to the successor state;
(b) where a state is absorbed by another state, the public debt, and rights and
obligations under contracts of the absorbed state, pass to the absorbing state;
(c) where part of a state becomes a separate state, local public debt, and rights and
obligations of the predecessor state under contracts relating to the territory of the
new state, pass to the new state.
Id.
213. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties arts. 11-12, Aug. 23,
1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter VCSST].
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Indian tribes and states that predate the states’ admittance into the
union. For example, two such tribes are the Pamunkey Tribe and the
Mattaponi Tribe, both of which treated with Virginia on May 29,
1677.214 These two tribes are currently recognized by the state of
215
Virginia, and also maintain land holdings in the state. As Professor
Victoria Sutton aptly noted, such pre-Constitutional treaties were
accepted by the United States with successor-in-interest logic: the
United States was the successor to the obligations of the former
colonies.216
Second, the United States chose to recognize property claims in
prior historical annexation cases. For instance, the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo (the Hidalgo Treaty), which was signed in 1848,
217
put an end to the Mexican War. Under the Hidalgo Treaty, Mexico
ceded the upper portion of California, New Mexico, and Arizona to
the United States, and recognized American claims over Texas, with
the Rio Grande demarcating its southern boundary.218 The United
States paid Mexico $15 million for the land, assumed the claims of
American citizens against Mexico, recognized prior southwest land
grants, and offered citizenship to Mexicans that were residing in the
ceded territories.219 Although this territorial acquisition differs
somewhat from the Republic of Texas case, the salient point is that
Article VIII of the Hidalgo Treaty specified that property owned by
Mexicans in the ceded territories would be inviolably respected,
regardless of whether the owners were absentee owners or ever
physically present in such territories.220 In brief, the case illustrates
214. The Treaty Between Virginia and the Indians, May 29, 1677, Colony of Va.-Indians,
reprinted in EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES & LAWS, 1697-1789, VIRGINIA
& MARYLAND LAWS 83 (Alden T. Vaughan & Deborah A. Rosen eds., 1998), available at
http://www.baylink.org/treaty/.
215. See Virginia Council on Indians: Virginia Tribes, http://indians.vipnet.org/tribes/
index.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
216. Sutton, supra note 119, at 545.
217. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlements, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat.
922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. art. VIII. The text of Article VIII states:
Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and which
remain for the future within the limits of the United States, as defined by the present
treaty, shall be free to continue where they now reside, or to remove at any time to the
Mexican Republic, retaining the property which they possess in the said territories, or
disposing thereof, and removing the proceeds wherever they please, without their
being subjected, on this account, to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever.
Those who shall prefer to remain in the said territories, may either retain the title and
rights of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United States. But they
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that “the transfer of sovereignty via state succession [had] no effect
221
on private property rights.” This legal principle had already been
settled under U.S. law in the earlier case of United States v.
Percheman, where the Supreme Court held that the cession of
territory from one sovereign to another does not interfere with
private property rights.222 Furthermore, in the later case of Barker v.
Harvey, the Supreme Court held that mission Indians were allowed to
make private property claims following the Mexican War, even
though the claim in that case failed because the Indians did not
comply with a statute requiring the claim to have been submitted
223
within a two-year statute of limitations period.
Third, the United States again adhered to state succession
224
The basic question that
principles at the end of the Civil War.
surfaced during this period was whether Confederate property
“passed to the United States upon the demise of the Confederacy.”225
Following the state succession model presented by international law,
Confederate property did pass to the United States at the end of the
Civil War.226 This conclusion was also supported by the Supreme
Court in cases immediately after the Civil War, where the court
concluded that as a matter of law, “the U.S. was entitled to all the
property and rights of the conquered confederate government.”227
shall be under the obligation to make their election within one year from the date of
the exchange of ratifications of this treaty; and those who shall remain in the said
territories after the expiration of that year, without having declared their intention to
retain the character of Mexicans, shall be considered to have elected to become
citizens of the United States.
In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans not
established there, shall be inviolably respected. The present owners, the heirs of these,
and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said property by contract, shall enjoy with
respect to it guaranties equally ample as if the same belonged to citizens of the United
States.
Id.
221. Ebenroth & Kemner, supra note 202, at 777.
222. 32 U.S. 51, 87 (1833). See also Townsend v. Greeley, 72 U.S. 326, 337 (1866) (holding
that municipal land held by the city of San Francisco as successor to the former pueblo
(meaning town) existing there was not held in absolute property; this land was held in trust for
the city’s inhabitants as it had been held under the laws of Mexico prior to cession under the
Hidalgo Treaty).
223. 181 U.S. 481, 490 (1901).
224. For further reading on the United States Civil War, see LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CIVIL
WAR DESK REFERENCE (Margaret E. Wagner et al. eds., 2002).
225. William J. Pallas, The Doctrine of State Succession and the Law of Historic Shipwrecks,
The Bell of Alabama: United States v. Steinmetz, 17 TUL. MAR. L.J. 343, 344 (1993).
226. Id. at 344-45.
227. Id. at 345 (citing United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. 414 (1873); Titus v. United States,
87 U.S. 475 (1874); Whitfield v. United States, 92 U.S. 165 (1875)).
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These principles were summarized by Justice Clifford in United States
v. Huckabee:
Complete conquest . . . carries with it all the rights of . . . the
conqueror, [and] by the completion of his conquest, becomes
the absolute owner of the property conquered from the
enemy, nation, or state. His rights are no longer limited to
mere occupation of what he has taken into his actual
possession, but they extend to all the property and rights of
the conquered state, including even debts as well as personal
and real property.228
Hence, the Supreme Court held in Huckabee that the liabilities of the
conquered become the liabilities of the conqueror.229 This outcome is
compelling because in the case of the Confederacy, the United States
absorbed a group of states that had seceded of their own volition; it
appears that in this scenario the United States had justifiable grounds
for refusing to honor the liabilities of the rogue government.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court unequivocally proclaimed that
assets and liabilities accrued to the absorbing state.
In sum, the United States has historically behaved consistently
with state succession principles. To begin, the United States applied
successor-in-interest logic to assume Indian treaties from the colonies.
Next, the United States recognized the inviolable nature of private
property in prior annexation cases such as the Hidalgo Treaty.
Finally, the United States followed the state succession model postCivil War, and even incorporated this logic into Supreme Court
precedent. Thus, this behavior implies that the United States should
have succeeded to the Treaty.
3. Historical Views Proclaimed by the United States. The
United States’ failure to assume the Treaty contradicts its behavior
just over a decade before the ICC decided the Cherokees’ claim.
More particularly, the United States was quite vocal about other
states being obliged to follow state succession principles. For
instance, when Germany absorbed Austria through the Anschluss of
1938, the United States argued that Germany should assume the
230
Not to be deterred, Germany retorted that the
debts of Austria.

228. 83 U.S. at 434-35 (emphasis added).
229. See id.
230. See Detlev F. Vagts, State Succession: The Codifiers’ View, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 285
(1993) (citing James Wilford Garner, Questions of State Succession Raised by the German
Annexation of Austria, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 421 (1938)). See also M.H. Hoeflich, Through a Glass
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United States had failed to follow its own prescription when it
231
annexed the Republic of Texas. This dispute was not resolved until
after World War II, and then it was decided in favor of the U.S.
position: Germany agreed to assume Austria’s liabilities.232 The key
point to glean from this example is that the United States was keenly
aware of the international law on state succession. As such, the
United States should have followed state succession principles and
succeeded to the Treaty.
To sum up, this section addressed the following issue: whether
the United States should have succeeded to the Treaty after it
annexed the Republic of Texas, given that this agreement was in all
likelihood a valid obligation of the predecessor state. The ICC held
that the United States was not responsible for the obligation in 1953,
but in reaching its dubious holding, the tribunal failed to consider the
international law on state succession. As such, an exploration of this
issue produces three conclusions. First, the United States failed to
adhere to state succession principles as codified in the contemporary
Restatement and VCSST. Second, the United States ignored its own
behavior during the colonization period, prior annexation cases, and
the post-Civil War era. Third, the United States contradicted its own
policy views as promulgated in the global community.
The
culmination of this evidence presents a cogent case for the
proposition that the United States should have succeeded to the
Treaty.
IV. ADVERSE POSSESSION—AN ALTERNATE CLAIM TO
RIGHT BY TREATY
When President Sam Houston wrote to then Attorney General
G. W. Terrell for an opinion on the Cherokee matter in 1842, Terrell
raised another legal issue that merits discussion. He opined that the
Cherokees’ claim was legally valid because “by settling and
continuously occupying their lands, the Cherokee had acquired an
inchoate right to them, which should have matured into a perfect

Darkly: Reflections upon the History of the International Law of Public Debt in Connection with
State Succession, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 39, 63-65 (1982).
231. See Detlev F. Vagts, International Law in the Third Reich, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 661, 690
(1990) (citing Garner, supra note 230).
232. Timothy W. Guinnane, Financial Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung: The 1953 London Debt
Agreement 21-22 (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 880, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=493802.
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title.”233 Terrell correctly asserted that title to land could be perfected
through settlement and continuous occupation. The Cherokees
probably had a valid legal claim to the land under the doctrine of
adverse possession, which is a method of acquiring title to property by
234
possession for a statutory period.
Adverse possession is a doctrine recognized in the civil codes and
235
legal traditions of many countries. Though adverse possession does
further utilitarian ends by quieting land titles,236 Oliver Wendell
Holmes succinctly stated another key underpinning of the doctrine in
terms of personhood: “the foundation of the acquisition of rights by
lapse of time is to be looked for in the position of the person who
gains them, not in that of the loser.”237 Because the Cherokees
immigrated to Texas, constituting their lives and beings in land that
they occupied for nearly twenty years, a claim of title by adverse
possession would have plainly satisfied personhood concerns.
Moreover, the doctrine would have also served a utilitarian purpose
by quieting title to property that the Cherokees claimed while living
under the sovereign jurisdiction of both Mexico and the Republic of
Texas. As a result, there is no viable reason why the Cherokees could
not have proffered an adverse possession claim to the disputed
territory as an alternative to a claim under the Treaty.238

233. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 79.
234. For the general elements of adverse possession, see 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession
§ 10 (2006) [hereinafter AMJUR]. For further reading on adverse possession, see Thomas W.
Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122 (1985);
William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Comment, Outlaws of the Past: A Western
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79 (1996);
Henry W. Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28 YALE L. J. 219 (1918); Henry W.
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1918).
235. Winter King, Illegal Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs, 44 HARV. INT’L L.
J. 433, 452 (2003).
236. Edward G. Mascolo, A Primer on Adverse Possession, 66 CONN. B. J. 303, 303 (1992).
237. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
238. Patently, this exercise is academic in nature because the hostile nature of the Texas
courts toward Indians during this period raises doubts as to whether the Cherokees would have
met with any success in pursuing an adverse possession claim, even if such claim had merit. See,
e.g., TEX. CONST., supra note 94, gen. provisions § 10 (denying Indians citizenship); Herndon v.
Casiano, 7 Tex. 322, 335 (1851) (“[T]hey were driven out of their homes and ancient possessions
by the incursions of hostile savages.”); Horton v. Crawford, 10 Tex. 382, 389 (1853)
(“[E]xtensive portions of our frontiers were also infested by the incursions of ferocious and
hostile savages.”); Kilpatrick v. Sisneros, 23 Tex. 113, 113 (1859) (discussing how Africans,
African descendants, and Indians were not citizens of Texas). Notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Texas recognized in dicta that the Cherokees may have acquired title
to lands in Texas pursuant to their settlement while under Mexican rule. See Herbert v. Moore,
Dallam 592, 594 (Tex. 1844) (“With one exception, assumed by some to have been made in
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In early Texas history, there were five basic elements to an
239
adverse possession claim, and these requirements remain generally
240
unchanged today.
First, there must have been “actual”
241
occupation, which is equivalent to the modern understanding of
entry and exclusive use. Entry and exclusive use of the property is a
central construct because it differentiates between simply seeing
favor of the Cherokees and their associates by the Mexican government, we know of no lands to
which the Indians ever set up an absolute, indefeasible title within the limits of the
republic . . . .”). Hence, although it would have been difficult to proffer, the claim did have
merit. The purpose of briefly exploring the topic in this article is to show that the Republic of
Texas likely acted in bad faith by refusing to abide by the Treaty (meaning Texas was acutely
aware that the Cherokees had probably acquired an alternative right to the disputed territory
via adverse possession). Without question, a rigorous analysis of the adverse possession claim
given the complex issues accompanying this historical period is beyond the scope of this Article
(for example, the potential conflict among Spanish, Mexican, and Texan laws, the likely title
disputes among land speculators, settlers, and the Cherokees regarding the territory, and so on).
239. Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, 171 (1884). In the preface to the list of adverse
possession elements, Associate Justice West stated: “It is well settled that, where a party relies
upon naked possession alone as the foundation for his adverse claim, it must be such an actual
occupancy that the law recognizes as sufficient, if persisted in for a long enough period of time,
to cut off the true owner’s right of recovery.” Id. While this case was decided several decades
after the Texas revolution, the elements enumerated in Satterwhite were discussed in earlier
Texas precedent, though not in well-articulated terms. See Jones v. Borden, 5 Tex. 410, 414
(1849) (“In support of possession, where this has been continued for the period prescribed by or
analogous to the statutes of limitation, a grant, deed, or any other instrument effectual to
convey title will be presumed. But possession is the essential basis of such presumption.”);
Lewis v. San Antonio, 7 Tex. 288, 305 (1851) (“If this enjoyment has been not only not
interrupted, but exclusive and adverse in its character, for the period . . . this also has been held
at common law as a conclusive presumption of title.”); Wheeler v. Moody, 9 Tex. 372, 372
(1853) (“It must be, in the language of the authorities, an actual, continued, adverse, and
exclusive possession for the space of time required by the statute.”); Charle v. Saffold, 13 Tex.
94, 108 (1854) (“This possession was notoriously in their own right, adverse to the plaintiff and
all others, and had, prior to the institution of suit, been continued for nearly sixteen years.”);
Lambert v. Weir, 27 Tex. 359, 361 (1864) (“[T]hey claim and hold, had and held adverse,
peaceable, continuous and uninterrupted possession for five years . . . under color of title . . . .”);
Parker v. Baines, 65 Tex. 605, 609 (1886) (“It is necessary, to set the statute of limitations in
motion, that the possession be actual, visible, notorious, distinct, and hostile.” (citation
omitted)). This Article avers that by analyzing the Cherokees’ claim under the more rigorous
adverse possession elements as recited in Satterwhite, the result—a right to possession of the
claimed lands—would be more cogent than analyzing the Cherokees’ claim under earlier cases
where the elements of adverse possession were not well-articulated (meaning that if the
Cherokees could have succeeded in proffering a claim under Satterwhite then, a fortiori, they
could have succeeded in their claim during the period in question, ceteris paribus).
240. Texas continues to cite the elements of adverse possession as outlined in Satterwhite.
E.g., Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1990) (citing Satterwhite, 61 Tex. at 171). In
the modern context, Texas defines adverse possession by statute as “an actual and visible
appropriation of real property, commenced and continued under a claim of right that is
inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another person.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 16.021(1) (Vernon 2005).
241. Satterwhite, 61 Tex. at 171.
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property and claiming it.242 In addition, this criterion provides a
precise moment from which one can count the years specified in the
statutory period required for an adverse possession claim, and also
provides a way to limit the geographical scope of the territorial title.243
In the case of the Cherokees, there is sufficient evidence to support
the assertion that there was actual possession of the claimed land.
The Cherokees began occupying the land shortly before negotiating a
244
treaty with the Mexican government in 1922 to inhabit the territory,
and continued their occupation until being forcibly removed in
1839.245 If there is any uncertainty in meeting this criterion, it would
be regarding the amount of land the Cherokees actually possessed.
But even this concern is negligible, because the Republic of Texas
recognized the location of the Cherokees’ holding—as evidenced by
246
As
the precise boundary demarcations identified in the Treaty.
such, the element appears to have been satisfied.
The second adverse possession element is that the possession
247
must have been visible and notorious. Visibility and notoriety are
important because the true property owner must notice that the land
is being adversely possessed to have the opportunity to evict or take
other action against the adverse possessor.248 The Cherokees plainly
satisfied these criteria, as both Mexico and the Republic of Texas
were aware that the Cherokees occupied the territory and claimed
that they owned the land. This assertion is supported by the
numerous attempted negotiations that the Cherokees had with the
Mexican government in their attempt to obtain official title to the
occupied lands,249 as well as by the Treaty with the Republic of
Texas.250 Hence, the Cherokees satisfied the visibility and notoriety
requirements.
The third adverse possession element is that the occupation must
have been hostile (meaning adverse, or without the legal right to

242. See Parker, 65 Tex. at 608-09.
243. Id.
244. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 178 (The Cherokees occupied territory in Texas and went
to San Antonio to meet with the provincial governor, where they entered into a treaty.).
245. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 110-11.
246. Treaty, supra note 90.
247. Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, 171 (1884).
248. Parker, 65 Tex. at 606, 609–10.
249. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 183.
250. See Treaty, supra note 90.
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possess the property),251 and “of such a character as to indicate
unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership in the
252
It is unequivocal that the Cherokees entered the
occupant.”
territory without the permission of Mexico in 1821, and that they
253
Granted, the Cherokees
intended to claim the land as their own.
made repeated attempts to obtain legal title to the property from the
Mexican government, but all such efforts failed.254 Even so, they
255
never relinquished or subordinated their territorial claim. What is
more, despite having executed the Treaty with the Republic of Texas
in 1836, the Cherokees were acutely aware that their right to hold and
256
occupy the land was in serious doubt.
Notwithstanding, they
steadfastly refused to surrender the territory; this defiance eventually
lead to the Cherokee War (and their forced removal).257 Thus, there
is significant evidence to show hostility, and the element was most
likely satisfied.

251. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419,
2426 (2001).
252. Satterwhite, 61 Tex. at 171 (citation omitted). More often than not, the hostility
element presents the greatest amount of difficulty for an adverse possession claim; it remains a
hotly debated topic today. See Stake, supra note 251, at 2426. Nevertheless, our purpose is not
to prove conclusively that the Cherokees acquired title to the land via adverse possession, but
instead to show that the claim was feasible, which illustrates bad faith on the part of the
Republic of Texas in abrogating the Treaty. Recall as well that the former Republic of Texas
Attorney General G.W. Terrell, a lawyer of this historical period, previously averred that the
Cherokees had acquired an inchoate right to the land. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78-79.
253. See Chance v. Branch, 58 Tex. 490, 492-93 (1883) (The original entry must have been
without the owner’s permission and with the intent to claim the property for an adverse
possession to occur; one cannot enter or hold in subordination to the owner.).
254. See supra Part I.
255. Id. See also CLARKE, supra note 12, at 78-79 (discussing how the Cherokees drove
“intruders” off their land during Mexico’s rule).
256. See, e.g., CLARKE, supra note 12, at 70-71 (explaining that by 1837 the Indians were
restless and distrustful of the white settlers, and that the Mexicans were attempting to woo the
Indians into their favor; this prompted Houston to offer Chief Bowles a post in the Texas
Army); id. at 73-74 (discussing how Houston attempted to lay out the boundary lines to the
Cherokees’ territory in 1838, but this act created anger among land speculators, citizens, and
soldiers with competing claims to the land; the Cherokees were aware that the whites contested
to their territorial claim). Note that even if one argues that the Cherokees held the land
subordinate to the Republic of Texas after the Treaty was executed, by this point in time, the
Cherokees had possessed the land for approximately fifteen years; this holding period was
probably long enough to meet the statutory requirements. See infra notes 258-63 and
accompanying text. Notwithstanding, this counterargument is problematic because land
speculators, settlers, and others were staking claims to the Cherokees’ land. CLARKE, supra
note 12, at 73-74.
257. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 73-74.
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The fourth adverse possession element requires that the claimant
258
This
occupy the property for a continuous statutory period.
element is important because the period of occupation fixed by law
should be “continuously and consistently adverse.”259 The Supreme
Court of Texas aptly characterized the policy behind this element
when it stated: “[A] party will not be allowed to blow hot and to blow
cold, for such conduct is calculated to trick and deceive the true
260
owner and lull him to sleep.” In the case of the Cherokees, at no
time did they subordinate their title claim to other individuals, as they
persistently occupied and claimed their lands for nearly two
261
decades.
Because no true owners exercised their right of entry
within the ten year period specified by the statute of limitations, the
owners’ right to enter the property was barred by law.262 Moreover, it
remains critical to acknowledge that the Cherokees deserted their
territory because they were removed by force—not because they
voluntarily abandoned their claim.263 Hence, it seems that this
element was met.

258. Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, 171 (1884).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 172.
261. See supra Part I. See also generally CLARKE, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining that the
Cherokees “claimed a large area of East Texas” from 1819 to 1839), 79 (discussing the former
Texas Attorney General G.W. Terrell’s opinion that “by settling and continuously occupying
their lands, the Cherokees had acquired an inchoate right to them”).
262. See Charle v. Saffold, 13 Tex. 94, 111 (1854). See also Portis v. Hill, 3 Tex. 273, 279-80
(1848) (“Of the several pleas of limitation of the defendant, Samuel A. Cummings, the first
appears to have been framed with especial reference to the 17th section of the act of limitations
of 1841, alleging that the defendant had been in the ‘adverse, peaceable possession of the said
land, using and enjoying the same,’ for a period of more than ten years. No reason is perceived
why this is not a good plea of the limitation prescribed by the 17th section of the statute.”). See
Redding v. Redding’s Ex’rs and Heirs, 15 Tex. 249, 251 (1855); Lambert v. Weir, 27 Tex. 359,
363 (1864); McMasters v. Mills, 30 Tex. 591, 594-95 (1868). For further evidence that a ten-year
statute of limitations was in effect during the years after the Texas revolution—and prior to
codification by statute—see Duncan v. Rawls, 16 Tex. 478, 482-85 (1856); Hall v. Phelps, Dallam
435, 440 (Tex. 1841) (discussing the application of a ten-year statute of limitations to a suit
involving land title).
263. This point is noteworthy not only because it shows the Cherokees did not voluntarily
abandon a claim to title, but also because the Republic of Texas passed legislation in 1836 that
declared a lawsuit was the only means to interrupt an adverse possessor’s peaceable possession.
An Act, Organizaing the Inferior Courts, and Defining the Powers and Jurisdiction of the Same,
§ 39 (1836) (Rep. of Tex.), reprinted in 1 GAMMEL’S THE LAW OF TEXAS, supra note 83
[hereinafter Act of 1836]. As the Supreme Court of Texas stated: “In the act of 20th
December, 1836, it was said, that ‘a peaceable possession can only be interrupted by an actual
suit being instituted, and prosecuted agreeably to the due forms of law. . . .’ We do not think the
legislature intended to change this rule [by the act of 1841].” Shields v. Boone, 22 Tex. 193, 198
(1858). As such, even if one argues that the English common law statute of limitations of
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Finally, though not required,264 color of title would have assisted
the Cherokee’s claim that they adversely possessed the disputed
265
Color of title
territory (including the extent of such possession).
generally requires that the adverse possessor’s claim is founded upon
266
a document that is defective in some respect. Here, of course, the
Cherokees relied on the Treaty, which contained a conveyance of a
demarcated territory. So even though the Treaty was declared null,
their continued occupation was based upon a document that the
Cherokees believed was legally valid. As such, color of title was
likely established for at least a portion of the statutory period.267
In summary, the Cherokees probably met the elements required
to claim title to the disputed territory under the doctrine of adverse
possession. Furthermore, the Tribe invested its labor to improve the
land, developed personhood connected to it, and presented the
requisite utility in quieting land title that is critical to the policy
underlying the adverse possession doctrine. Although it seems highly
improbable that the Cherokees could maintain an adverse possession
claim today, the foregoing analysis offers evidence of bad faith on the
Republic of Texas’s behalf in abrogating the Treaty. Attorney
General Terrell recognized that the Cherokees probably had an
inchoate right to the occupied territory that had matured into perfect
title,268 so it seems implausible that members of the Republic of Texas
Senate were not also aware of the applicability of the adverse
possession doctrine.269 Therefore, the Senate’s argument that the
provisional government exceeded its powers by entering the Treaty,

twenty years was applicable to an adverse possession claim, see, for example, Lewis v. San
Antonio, 7 Tex. 288, 308 (1851), the Act of 1836 implies that forcibly removing the Cherokees
did not stay the statute of limitations from running (as there was never a legal action filed
against the Cherokees).
264. See Satterwhite, 61 Tex. at 171.
265. See Lambert, 27 Tex. at 365; Charle, 13 Tex. at 111-12. This type of claim is known as
constructive possession. See AMJUR, supra note 234, § 124 (stating “[c]olor of title is required to
extend an actual possession of a part of a tract of land constructively over the rest of it”).
266. AMJUR, supra note 234, § 123.
267. Although not explored here, a claim under color of title reduced the requisite statute of
limitation period under Texas law. Act of 1836, supra note 263, § 39 (The legislature passed a
five year statute of limitations in cases of adverse possession where the property was held by a
Republic of Texas citizen under color of title that was recorded in the proper county.).
268. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 79.
269. See generally Act of 1836, supra note 263, § 39 (The Republic of Texas Senate enacted
statutory law governing adverse possession.). See also generally supra note 239 (There were
numerous adverse possession cases during this historical period.).
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thereby injuring the citizenry and the country,270 appears spurious
when one recognizes that the Cherokees were likely already entitled
to the property under the doctrine of adverse possession.
V. TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
This Article previously averred that the ICC mistakenly held that
the Cherokees forfeited the traditional fiduciary relationship existing
between the United States and its indigenous peoples by emigrating
to the Republic of Texas.271 However, rather than being a result of
simple ignorance as to the facts surrounding the Cherokees’ decision
to emigrate, the ICC’s argument resembles a mere pretext when one
considers the plethora of cases in which the United States has not
acted in a way that would even come close to fulfilling the
requirements of a fiduciary relationship.272 Moreover, throughout the
nation’s history, the United States has repeatedly stripped land away
273
from Indians, and this reprehensible conduct should not be ignored.
The purported fiduciary role applicable to the Indians was
spelled out early in U.S. history with the 1787 passage of the
Northwest Ordinance: “The utmost good faith shall always be
observed towards the Indians; their lands shall never be taken from
274
The fulfillment of this fiduciary
them without their consent . . . .”
role did not always fall upon deaf ears: Justice Marshall echoed this
sentiment in Worcester v. Georgia, where he explained that the
Cherokee Nation was a sovereign entity, in which the laws of the state
of Georgia had no force, as “[t]he whole intercourse between the

270. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 72.
271. Texas-Cherokee v. United States, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n 522, 533 (1953).
272. See Clinton, supra note 2, at 99. See also Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian
Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 258-65 (discussing how the United States has a long and
egregious history of violating treaties with American Indians). For further reading on how the
modern-day U.S. Supreme Court has stripped inherent powers away from tribes and transferred
those powers to states, see Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s
Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003).
273. See Clinton, supra note 2, at 82-85. See also Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and
Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 42-51 (1991) (exploring the implications of placing American
Indian property rights on equal footing with non-Indian property rights); Rebecca Tsosie, Land,
Culture and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property in America, 34 IND. L.
REV. 1291, 1306-12 (2001) (proposing a framework on “intercultural justice” that incorporates
indigenous people’s interests in sovereignty and property).
274. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of
the River Ohio, 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 340-41 (1787), quoted in Wiessner,
supra note 147, at 571.
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United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested
275
in the government of the United States.” The Supreme Court again
reiterated the fiduciary role in Barker v. Harvey, when Justice Brewer
stated: “It is undoubtedly true that this government has always
recognized the fact that the Indians were its wards, and entitled to be
protected as such, and this court has uniformly construed all
legislation in the light of this recognized obligation.”276 Given its welldocumented and long-standing fiduciary obligation, it is surprising
that the U.S. government has frequently been unjust toward the
Indians.277
Of course, the United States is not alone in its mistreatment of
indigenous peoples. For instance, the abhorrent treatment of the
Aboriginal people of Australia is infamous throughout the
international community. The British reduced Australia’s Aboriginal
population to four percent of its former strength in one century,278 and
like the United States, the Australian government now faces
retribution as the Aborigines proffer land claims to vast areas of the
continent.279 More proximate to the United States is Canada, where
the government recently offered a formal apology to its indigenous
peoples for years of neglect, including the widespread abuse of Indian
children in the country’s federally-funded boarding schools.280 In
Latin America—another region characterized by large Indian
populations—similar cases of injustice abound. For example, Brazil’s
Karaja Indians made headlines in recent years after journalists
discovered that local activists contract with the Karjas to capture fish,
turtles, and animal skins in exchange for alcohol.281 Because a large
percentage of the Karajas are addicted to alcohol, exchanging alcohol
for these services puts these people in a position of slavery and
275. 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
276. 181 U.S. 481, 492 (1901).
277. For a contemporary view of the atrocities committed against the American Indians, as
well a newly proposed theory of justice that might serve to redress these wrongs, see William
Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(2005).
278. See Ben Kiernan, Cover-Up and Denial of Genocide: Australia, the USA, East Timor,
and the Aborigines, 34 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 163, 177 (2002).
279. See Phil Mercer, Aborigines Dreaming of Land, BBC NEWS, Oct. 8, 2002, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2309249.stm.
280. Indigenous Canadians Get Apology, BBC NEWS, Jan. 8, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/americas/45797.stm. See also Rosie Goldsmith, Abuse in Canada, BBC NEWS, Dec.
28, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/americas/1091198.stm.
281. Karaja Indians are Exploited by Alcohol, Institute Centro de Vida, July 16, 1998,
available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/42/091.html.
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exploitation.282 In fact, governments throughout the Americas are
failing in their commitment to the region’s indigenous peoples, as
these groups remain some of the most marginalized and povertystricken in the world.283 Thus, with such commonplace abuse, it has
become increasingly vital for concerned actors on the global stage to
keep a watchful eye on the maintenance and advancement of
indigenous peoples’ rights.
Without question, contemporary international thinking has
advanced the cause of indigenous peoples. For instance, the United
Nations (U.N.) now has an established body—the Permanent Forum
on Indigenous Issues (PFII)—which serves in a consultative capacity
to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).284 The PFII
provides expert advice to the ECOSOC, raises awareness and
promotes integration and coordination of indigenous-related
activities within the U.N. system, and prepares and disseminates
information on matters of indigenous import.285 In addition, the U.N.
has also benefited from the efforts of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, which drafted the “United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in 1993.286 The
Commission on Human Rights set up an open-ended intercessional
working group to review and expand this instrument in 1995,287 and
after more than a decade of refinement, the Human Rights Council
288
adopted a final version of the document in 2006 (Declaration). If
the Declaration is adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, it will

282. Id.
283. Americas
‘Failing
Native
Peoples,’
BBC
NEWS,
Oct.
11,
2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2318757.stm.
284. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, History and
Mandate of the Permanent Forum, http://www.unhchr.ch/indigenous/history.htm (last visited
Aug. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Permanent Forum]. For a brief overview of the principal organs of
the United Nations, see United Nations, Organization Chart of the United Nations System,
http://www.un.org/aboutun/unchart.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
285. Permanent Forum, supra note 284.
286. FACT SHEET NO. 9 (REV. 1), U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1997), http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/ publications/docs/fs9.htm
(last visited Aug. 14, 2006) [hereinafter FACT SHEET NO. 9]. See also, Report of the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities, Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at 103, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct.
28, 1994).
287. FACT SHEET NO. 9, supra note 286.
288. The Vice-President of the Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on
the First Session of the Human Rights Council, at 58, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (June 30, 2006) [hereinafter Declaration].
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probably be the most comprehensive statement of indigenous
peoples’ rights ever developed, as it establishes collective rights to an
289
unprecedented degree in the field of international human rights law.
The Declaration reflects modern international thinking on the
rights of indigenous peoples and therefore offers persuasive moral
guidance to the United States should the Cherokees renew their
claim. More specifically, an examination of three pertinent articles in
the Declaration will suffice to demonstrate its utility. First, Article 10
states: “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their
lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free,
prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and
after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible,
290
Without question, the historical
with the option of return.”
evidence shows that the Republic of Texas forcibly removed the
Cherokees.291 Thus, this principle was violated. Second, the first
paragraph of Article 28 discusses the restoration of confiscated
property by stating:
Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can
include restitution or, when this is not possible, of a just, fair and
equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used,
and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or
292
damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.

Pursuant to this principle, the Cherokees are entitled to recovery of
lands that were confiscated without their consent by the Republic of
Texas, or in the alternative, compensation for the property.
Nevertheless, these two principles are probably inapplicable because
they apply to actions taken by the Republic of Texas, a now-extinct
state. Consequently, a third section—Article 37, paragraph 1—likely
provides the strongest guidance regarding the Cherokees’ claim:
“Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance
and enforcement of Treaties, Agreements and other Constructive
Arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have
States honour and respect such Treaties, Agreements and other

289. UNITED NATIONS GUIDE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, LEAFLET NO. 5: THE DRAFT
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/racism/indileaflet5.doc [hereinafter LEAFLET] (last visited Aug. 14,
2006).
290. Declaration, supra note 288, art. 10.
291. See HOIG, supra note 47, at 190.
292. Declaration, supra note 288, art. 28, ¶ 1.
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Constructive Arrangements.”293 Here, the principle is unequivocal in
advocating that the United States honor the Treaty because it was in
all likelihood a valid agreement when the United States annexed the
Republic of Texas.
Throughout U.S. history, the government has systematically
violated the rights of Indians despite having promulgated a role of
interaction characterized by good faith, honesty, and fair dealing.
Regrettably, United States’ behavior is not anomalous: similar
incidences of mistreatment of indigenous peoples have occurred in
Australia, Canada, and countries in Latin America. The U.N. has
taken a lead role on the issue of indigenous rights in recent years, and
though it has not yet produced a binding treaty, it has contributed
substantively to the maintenance and improvement of such rights by
crafting the Declaration. By applying key sections of this persuasive
instrument to the Cherokees’ claim, the analysis concludes that there
is a compelling moral justification for the United States to honor the
Treaty. Furthermore, as a leader on the world stage, the United
States has a unique opportunity to show genuine support for the
Declaration’s principles.
CONCLUSION
The Treaty executed in 1836 between the Republic of Texas and
the Cherokees appears to have been a binding agreement. The pact
was properly executed by the provisional government of the Republic
of Texas, which had the authority and obligation to treat with the
Indians under the Plan and Powers.294 Furthermore, while the
295
agreement did incorporate the Solemn Declaration, which granted
296
territory to the Cherokees, the Treaty neither contained a provision
that required Senate ratification,297 nor did the provisional

293. Id. art. 37, ¶ 1. See generally Angela R. Hoeft, Coming Full Circle: American Indian
Treaty Litigation from an International Human Rights Perspective, 14 LAW & INEQ. 203, 248-55
(1995) (discussing the canons of treaty construction and their application to the agreements of
indigenous peoples).
294. See Plan and Powers, supra note 83, art. III.
295. See Treaty, supra note 90, pmbl. (“This Treaty is made—conformably to a declaration
[the Solemn Declaration] made by the last General Consultation, at St. Felipe, and dated 13th
November A.D. 1835.”).
296. CLARKE, supra note 12, at 60-61. See also JOURNALS, supra note 83, at 546-47.
297. See supra, Part II.A. However, the Senate ultimately did reject the treaty. See also
generally Treaty, supra note 90; Plans and Powers, supra note 83, art. 3 (“They shall have power,
and it is hereby made the duty of the Governor and Council, to treat with the several tribes of
Indians concerning their Land Claims.”).
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government have a mechanism by which to ratify treaties under the
298
Plan and Powers. The simple fact is that the Republic of Texas was
at war with a powerful nation—Mexico—and the allegiance of the
Cherokees and affiliated tribes was believed to be critical to the
299
burgeoning state if its war for independence was to succeed.
As
such, the Republic of Texas was bound to keep its word and honor
the Treaty under the well known international principle—pacta sunt
300
servanda—which means that agreements must be kept. Each party
explicitly recognized the capacity of the other party to treat by
entering the pact,301 and more importantly, the Republic of Texas did
302
not justify abrogating the Treaty. For these reasons, the Treaty was
probably valid under domestic and international law.
The most noteworthy decision regarding the Cherokees’ claim
303
issued from the ICC in 1953, but this administrative tribunal
reached what was likely an inequitable outcome that was the result of
a flawed analysis. The ICC misinterpreted and misapplied case
precedent, ignored key historical facts required to properly adjudicate
the claim, and failed to consider the Treaty within the rubric of
international law. More particularly, the ICC’s conclusion that the
United States did not have to succeed to the Treaty after the
annexation of the Republic of Texas ignored three key issues: first,
the decision violated traditional state succession principles as codified
in both the modern Restatement and VCSST;304 second, the decision
cannot be reconciled with U.S. precedent concerning private property
305
rights in historical cases of annexation; and third, the decision
contradicted earlier policy positions on state succession promulgated
by the United States in the international arena.306 Hence, it seems
307
that the United States should have succeeded to the obligation.

298. See Plan and Powers, supra note 83.
299. See CLARKE, supra note 12, at 64 (explaining that the Republic of Texas wanted
Cherokee neutrality with regard to its military campaign against Mexico); id. at 120 (stating that
Chief Bowles “may have been the single most important man in Texas’ struggle for
independence” because he kept the Texas Cherokees neutral).
300. See Wiessner, supra note 147, at 567.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 166-76.
302. See id.
303. See Texas-Cherokees v. United States, 2 Indian Cl. Comm’n 522, 522 (1953).
304. See supra Part III.B.1.
305. See supra Part III.B.2.
306. See supra Part III.B.3.
307. The fact that the United States probably should have succeeded to the Treaty does not
imply that the agreement could not be abrogated. The U.S. Supreme Court held long ago that

01__NELSON.DOC

46

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/9/2007 10:01 AM

[Vol 17:1

While the Treaty in all likelihood remains a valid instrument,
there is another legal argument that suggests the Cherokees had
already gained title to the land in question. In short, the Cherokees
probably had acquired an inchoate right to the disputed territory that
308
matured into perfect title under the doctrine of adverse possession.
Satisfying the essential elements of this traditional rule of law bolsters
the Cherokees’ claim to the property because even if the Treaty was
invalid, then adverse possession provided an alternative right of title
to the land that met both personhood and utilitarian concerns.
Though it seems marvelous that the Cherokees could pursue a claim
for adverse possession at this late point in time, the fact that this
matter has long been ignored shows bad faith on the part of the
former Republic of Texas government, the state of Texas
government, and the U.S. government in refusing to honor the
Treaty.
Finally, even if one concludes that the Treaty was invalid, or in
the alternative, that the Cherokees had no sustainable claim to the
land under the doctrine of adverse possession, any decision that
denies the Treaty’s validity proves difficult to reconcile for a nation
that has held steadfast to its obligations as a fiduciary to its
indigenous peoples since as early as 1787.309 When the putative
fiduciary role is considered alongside the historical legal precedent,
policy, and behavior of the United States, the decision to dishonor the
Treaty is even more perplexing. In fact, one can argue that by failing
to acknowledge and honor the obligation of the former Republic of
Texas, especially in the context of contemporary thinking on the
rights of indigenous peoples as expressed in the Declaration,310 the
behavior of the United States is ignominious.
This Article is not without its faults. Most notably, it is not
written by a legal historian, and some students of law may argue that
it is inappropriate—even in a scholarly pursuit—to apply modern
codification of international law to the analysis of a historical treaty.
However, given the exceedingly slow, almost “ablation-like” process
by which international law evolves, the codification of doctrine

Indian rights derived from a treaty could be abrogated unilaterally by Congress through
subsequent statutory enactments. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
308. See supra Part IV.
309. See generally Wiessner, supra note 147, at 571 (discussing U.S. passage of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1789, which pledged the U.S. would show the “utmost good faith . . .
towards the Indians”).
310. See LEAFLET, supra note 289.
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exemplified by the contemporary instruments cited in this article is at
best a de minimis issue in the analysis of the Treaty. All the same,
such issues foster opportunities for students of both domestic and
international law to offer further insight and analysis into the
interpretation of the Treaty, not only within the context of the law
itself, but by encouraging interest in specific cases of historical
precedent—such as the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo—which may
311
shed further light on the instrument’s validity.
Furthermore,
students of history and law can analogize this matter to similar cases
of broken treaties with indigenous peoples occurring in places such as
312
the United States, Australia, Canada, and Latin America.
In the
end, the numerous branches that one can explore serve not only to
shed light on the Cherokees’ claim, but also can help other domestic
and international tribes facing like circumstances better understand
and resolve their own issues.
The reader is the final arbiter regarding the validity of the
Treaty, but the evidence presented in this Article lays out a cogent
case for the Cherokees should they decide to renew their claim. Yet,
even if the United States recognizes the Treaty as binding, the
unanswered question is if the government should provide restitution
to the Cherokees in the form of federal recognition bringing federal
313
Whatever the final
money, compensation and land, or both.
outcome, any redress should accomplish one essential objective: it
must help what was historically the most important tribe in the region
save what remains of its cultural heritage.

311. See generally Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 217, 9 Stat. at 926-32 (ceding
territory from Mexico to the United States).
312. For example, the Oneida Nation recently sparred with the City of Sherrill, New York,
in the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the Tribe’s ability to assert sovereignty over its land.
Passage of Time at Issue in Oneida Nation Case, INDIANZ.COM, January 12, 2005,
http://www.indianz.com/news/2005/005975.asp. Despite being recognized by a Treaty in 1794,
the Oneida’s 300,000 acre reservation fell out of possession of the Tribe over the next two
hundred years, and the city argued that the passage of time barred the territory from being
labeled as “Indian Country,” which makes it free from state and local taxation. Id.
313. Sutton, supra note 119, at 545.

